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ST. JOHN'S
LAW REVIEW




THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND LEGISLATIVE BACK-
GROUND OF THE BUILDING ZONE RESOLUTION
T HE city abhors equilibrium; within it whole peoples migrate,
great industries move. The processes of extension and evacua-
tion; deterioration and growth are vital to its life.1 Phoenix-like,
the city refashioned its skyline. A new architecture emerged. Yet
little more than a decade ago this high mobility was not subject to
control. Natural segregating forces produced the areas of big busi-
ness and skyscrapers, the shopping and residential sections. But
there was no economic security.2 When several factories invaded
a district devoted mainly to retail trade or when a department store
was established in a fashionable residential section the district was
* In its original form this paper was the writer's contribution to the semi-
nar in Administrative Law conducted by Professor Felix Frankfurter in the
Harvard Law School during the academic year 1926-1927.
1 See the study by Edward C. Pratt. "The Economic Cause of Congestion,
Distribution of Industry and Workers," Vol. XLIII Columbia University
Studies in History, etc. (1911); "Zoning and Mobility of Urban Population,"
by Nels Anderson, 1 City Planning, 155 (1925), and "The City," by Park &
Burgess (1925), p. 75, contain interesting discussions of city growth.
2 "The evil results of allowing a city to develop 'naturally' is the best evi-
dence of the need of social control of land utilization. .... The more inten-
sive the use of the land, the more highly developed must be the social control."
"Elements of Land Economics," edited by Richard T. Ely, pp. 86, 23-n. Also,
"Towards an Understanding of the Metropolis," by Robert Murray Haig, 40
Quart. J. Econ. 2.
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well on its way to be "blighted." " Problems of sanitation and
safety pressed for solution. A commission was appointed to
study and report.' On July 25, 1916, the Zoning Ordinance was
passed. New York City entered upon a new era of social control
of land utilization. Old techniques were abandoned. A new admin-
istrative agency-the board of appeals in zoning was sworn into
public service. This city's venture fathered the vogue in zoning
activity throughout the land. The resident of fashionable Murray
Hill and the garage builder-the mass of property owners generally
were forced into contact with yet another governmental agency.
What technique for action did it fashion? To what extent has that
action authority of law,--i. e., freedom from judicial review? What
is the scope and temper of the judicial review to which its actions
are subject? With the answers to these questions this paper is
mainly concerned.
The Legislative History of the Building Zone Resolution of the
City of New York.
A natural concomitant of land urbanization is the increased
restriction of the field within which the owner may deal freely with
his property. That ownership is a concept with a changing con-
tent becomes strikingly apparent in the city where the need for gov-
ernmental interference in the interest of public health, safety, and
convenience of the interrelated group of communities, is incontesta-
bly urgent. The germs of such interference with property rights
may be found in the city laws of long ago.' Three main purposes
3 "Blighted Districts: Their Cause and Cure," 1 City Planning, 160 (1925);
Department of Commerce: Zoning Primer (1922). See also "The Social
Objective in Regional Planning," by Thomas Adams; and "Some Principles
to Guide Community Zoning," by Charles K. Sumner, in 15 Nat. Mun. Rev.,
74, 693 (1926).
4 The Approach of the Commission to its problem may be gleaned from a
few short quotations: (1) "There is an intimate and necessary relation between
conservation of property values as here proposed and the conservation
of public health, safety and general welfare." Commission on Building
Districts and Restrictions (N. Y.) Tentative Report, March 10, 1916,
pp. 4 and 5. (2) "It is not possible to secure the light and air that is essential
to both the profitable use of land and to the health and comfort of the public
unless the height and area covered by the buildings is limited," and" . . . there
is too much at stake to permit a mere habit of thought to stand in the way."
Final Report, June 2, 1916, p. 27; also p. 30.
5 1 Minutes of the Common Council of the City of New York (1675-1776),
137. This will be referred to hereafter as M. C. C.
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appear; to prevent deterioration, to achieve a "reguler order and
uniformity in the streets" and to eliminate those factors which by
their unpleasantness have a bad effect on health and on the growth
of the district in which they are located. It might be well hastily
to observe the technique employed.
1. Preventing Deterioration.
"No person within the town of said municipium of Tarentum
shall unroof or demolish or dismantle any house without a decree
of the senate, unless he shall intend to restore such a house to its
former condition." That was the safeguard against voluntary demo-
lishnent of the existing buildings, the attempt to preserve the status
quo, found in the Charter of Tarentum, which was drawn up in the
time of Cicero.6 Not dissimilar is the legislation in seventeenth
century New York. Acting upon a complaint on behalf of those
who .could not find houses to live in or land to build upon, the
Mayor and Aldermen, in 1676, appointed a committee desiring "that
forthwith they Servey and value all the vacant Land; and ruinated
and decayed houses within this City, convenient or fitt to build"
and to report their findings and appraisals.7 On the basis of the
report rendered, it was ordered that the right owners shall build
or sell out to purchasers offering to pay the appraised value, and,
in any event, "Owners or Purchasers are to build Sufficient dwelling
houses and to bee built within one yeare after the Publication here-
of or other wise to bee Rendered un Capeable of building upon
Saide land hereafter and the Land bee lookt as other uacant Land
and ualued accordingly and disposed of by the gouernor for the
Publick good." 8
2. Regulation of Building.
Further than to declare against decay and to encourage build-
ing on vacant land to accommodate its growing population, old
6 "Six Roman Laws," translated by E. G. Hardt. Les Municipi Tarentini.
p. 109. See also chapter on Roman Building Laws in "Ancient Town Plan-
ning," by F. Haverfield (Oxford, 1913).
7 1 M. C. C., 14.
s By order of the Governor in Counsel, to the Mayor or Deputy Mayor
and Aldermen of the City of New York to publish this order, proclaimed the
13th of June, 1676. 1 M. C. C. 19. Cf. 3 Russ. Stat. 303, 19 Car. II, c. 3-
"for rebuilding the City of London." Section 15 provided that in case of per-
sons omitting to rebuild, their ground shall be valued by an inquest and
subjected to sale by the Mayor, Aldermen, and Common Council of the City.
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New York did not go. To be sure, two months after the law men-
tioned, provision was made to keep record of the building activity
undertaken in pursuance thereof, by a system of inspection and
certification. But positive supervision of building went no farther
than to appoint a committee of five, four of whom had to approve
before paving in front of houses and in the streets could lawfully
be begun.' It was not until 1684, eight years later, 0 that "sworne
surveyors" were appointed for the city, "by whose advise and direc-
tions the ground in this city shall be built and that none do build
before the front of their ground . . . (except as) layed out
by them-as they shall direct-that a reflular order and uniformity
may be kept and observed in the streets." Nothing more is found
in seventeenth or eighteenth century New York," and research in
the field of ancient town planning seems to indicate that regulation
stopped with the superficial provision for intersecting streets -and
some degree of uniformity in the grouping of dwelling houses.' 2
3. Eliminating the Nuisance Uses.
There were two objections to property uses of this kind: their
effect on health, and on the growth of the neighborhood. The
earliest order in New York City, that owners of slaughter houses
and tann pits shall "remove ye same out of ye citty." stated the
first reason in its prefix, and forty years later, in 1720, when re-
S"'Att a Mectinge the 24th date of July 1676.
"In pursuance of former ordrs made for the Buildings of houses in this
Citty & Settinge forth ye ground Itt is ordered that noe Person or Persons
whatsoeuer Shall build Erect or Sett Upp any house or houses Upon any
ground within this Citty Unless the same be first Viewed allowed & Sett forth
Undr ye hands of (naming five men) . . . or any fowre of them And they
to Certify the Same to the Mayor or Deputy & Aldermen to the End the
same may be Recorded In the Records of this Citty." 1 M. C. C. 21.
10"That there be Sworne Surveyrs Appoynted for this Citty by whos
Advise and Directions the ground with this City Shall be Built and that
none doe Build Before the front of their ground (be) Reed & layd out by
them, And as they Shall Direct That A regular Ordor, and Uniformity may
be kept and Observed in the Streetes, And Building{ and yt none Paue before
their houses, but in Such manner, as Apoynted by the Sayd Surveyors, And
that for Laying out of Each house Lott. and giueing Certificate thereof the
Sayd Surveyors Shall Haue and Receue from the Owner thereof the Summe
of Six Shilling." 1 M. C. C. 137 (March 15, 1684).
1 "New York as an Eighteenth Century Municipality. Prior to 1731," by
A. E. Peterson, in 74 Col. Univ. Studies in History, Economics and Public
Law. See Chap. III, "Regulation of Land and Streets."
12 See "Ancient Town Planning, supra note 6, at 29, 35, 52.
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moval to another place was urged, the second reason was men-
tioned.
"We the committee-are humbly of opinion that the
present slaughter houses fronting the East River at the east
end of Queen Street--are become a public nuisance and
ought in a short time be removed in order more convenient
and ornamental buildings may be, erected there and in that
neighborhood which noiw are retarded by occasion of said
slaughter houses." 11
The increased seriousness of problems of health, order, con-
venience, brought on by the great number and size of cities that
developed rapidly after the Civil War, was met not by a technique,
but by an extension of the old. There was a recurrent classification
and allocation of the objectionable businesses and industries," many
of them not nuisances per se. Buildings not devoted to such uses
were subjected to increasingly severe regulations over plan and
mode of construction and materials used therefor. Thus, standards
of sanitation in factories and tenements and safeguards against fire
generally, were established.15 Before we turn to the work of the
New York Commission on Building Districts and Restrictions, two
apparent innovations in technique ought be mentioned. The first is
limiting the heights of buildings. The earliest example in the
United States is the act passed by the Massachusetts legislature in
1904.28 Though new in this country, limitation of the heights of
13 The law of 1676 is found in 1 M. C. C. 20. The report of the com-
mittee is given in 3 M. C. C. 249-51; the complaint is stated in 3 M. C. C. 241.
Protection against fire was another important interest. In 1795 the Penn-
sylvania legislature enpowered the Mayor and Common Council to pass an
ordinance forbidding the erection of wooden buildings in a certain part of the
city. This was held 0onstitutional. Respublica z. Dtiguit, 2 Yeats 493 (Pa.
1795).
1' The amendment to the Municipal Act of Ontario, L 1904, s 541-A, has
been referred to as the earliest type of zoning enabling act. By two-thirds
vote of its council, a city could pass and enforce by-laws "to prevent, regulate
and control the location, erection, use of buildings as laundries, stores and
manufactures." To which later was added, "stables for horses for delivery
purposes, butcher shops, blacksmith shops, forges, dog kennels, hospitals or
infirmaries for horse, dogs .or other animals."
15 In this connection, see the series of articles by Thomas Reed Powell,
"Administrative Exercise of the Police Power," 24 Harv. L. Rev., 268, 333,
441. The cases cited in his footnotes on page 271 illustrate the scope of the
regulations of sanitation and safety in constructions.
36 The act was upheld. Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364 (1908), aff'd, 214
U. S. 91 (1909).
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buildings in thickly populated communities dates back a long time.
The "building law" of Rome regulated the heights to which tene-
ments could be built and also included provisions similar to those
discussed above, i. e., cemeteries and brickfields were excluded from
the city. 17 The other kind of regulation referred to, is the reser-
vation of certain parts of the city for strictly residential purposes.
It is believed that the enabling acts of Wisconsin and Minnesota,
both passed in 1913, empowering cities of twenty-five and fifty
thousand respectively, to create such districts, are very early
examples.
1 8
It is readily apparent that the complementary processes of
segregating nuisance and other offensive uses and reserving certain
parts for desirable uses, residential or otherwise, in addition to
supervision over construction and maintenance of buildings gen-
erally are all promotive of the numerous elements that are said to
comprise the "public welfare." But the pressure of forces or con-
ditions, call it what you will, economic and social, as indicated in
the preceding part of this paper, operating in the largest city in the
country, dramatically exposed the inadequacy of the old technique,
that of seeking to control the evils within narrow and perhaps con-
tiguous fields by successive, independent enactments. It was an ex-
haustive study of the city as a whole that suggested the new
municipal venture in property regulation, the technique of controlled
zoning.
On February 27, 1913, the board of estimate and apportion-
ment, in pursuance of a resolution beginning-
'7 Haverfield's investigation disclosed rules by the emperors limiting the
height of tenement houses which formed the "insulae" and also rules forbid-
ding balconies and similar structures which might impede the light and air in
narrow streets. It was a common rule thit cemeteries and brickyards had to
be located outside the area of habitation. As to the latter, it was said that
by "Royal Law" dating probably from one of the Attilid rules (300 B. C.),
brickfields were expressly prohibited from Pergamum. See "Ancient Town
Planning," supra note 6, at 137, 52. It is interesting to note that before the
recent Euclid case, the language and decision of the Supreme Court in Hada-
chek v. Sebastian, 36 Sup. Ct. 143 (1915), was urged in state courts before
whom the constitutionality 9f-zoning was presented. That was a case uphold-
ing the exclusion of brickflelds from the city of Los Angeles.
xsWis. Laws (1913), ch. 743; Minn. Laws (1913), ch. 420. Cf. N. Y.
Laws 1913, ch. 774-Housing Law for second class cities and also providing
for limited residence areas.
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"Whereas, there is a growing "sehtiment in the com-
munity to the effect that the time has come when effort should
be made to regulate the height, size, and arrangement of
buildings erected within the limits of the City of New York;
in order to arrest the seriously increasing evil of shutting off
light and air from other buildings and from public streets,
to prevent unwholesome and dangerous congestion both in
living conditions and in street and transit traffic and to
reduce the hazards of 'fire and peril to life
appointed a Heights of Buildings' Commission that was to-
. . inquire into and investigate conditions actually
existing and report. whether in their judgment, it
would be lawful and desirable 'for the purposes of such
regulation to clivide the city into districts or into zones and
to prescribe the regulations of the heights, size and arrange-
ment of buildings upon different bases in such different dis-
tricts or zones." "'
As a consequence' of its report, the mtate legislature enacted an
amendment and addition to the Greater New York Charter,"0 em-
powering the board of estimate and apportionment to make such
divisions and impose such restrictions, "having reasonable regard
to the character of buildings . . . the value of the land and the
use to which it may be put." The grant of power was conditioned,
however, upon the appointment by the board of estimate of a com-
mission "to recommend the boundaries of districts and appropriate
regulations to be enforced therein . . . and that said board (of
estimate and apportionment) shall not determine the boundaries of
any district nor impose any regulations until after the final report
of a commission so appofinted.2 1
3" Mr. George .McAneny, president of the Borough of Manhattan at the
time, asked for the appointment of the Heights Commission. It had nineteen
newnbi-rs. numbering amiong them business men, representatives of labor, stu-
t-ts of social problems. exper:s on taxation and city planning, and, of course,
lawyers. EdivIarl M. Bassett was chairman; George B. Ford was secretary.
It reported Dec. 21, 1913.
20 N. Y. Laws 1914, ch. 470, amending Greater New York Charter by add-
ing § 242-a and § 242-b. It was passed April 20, 1914.
• The charter amendments provided a further guarantee against hasty and
ill-considered action by the Commission, namely, the board was not to use its
delegated powers before it had all the facts and conclusion stated in a tenta-
tive report which was required to be discussed at designated public hearings.
Until that was done the .Commission was without power to submit a final
report.
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Not more than two months elasped before the Commission on
Building Districts and Restrictions, appointed by the board of esti-
mate, pursuant to this condition, was at work.2  As regards the
division of the city into height, area and use districts, the board of
estimate and apportionment. on July 25, 1916, passed the Building
Zone Resolution, substantially as submitted in the Commission's
final report. The subsequent amendments and additions to the
Greater New York Charter indicated in the footnote are important.
23
But inasmuch as they concern the administrative features of zoning,
they will be discussed hereafter. It is important, however,
to note here that the original enabling act of 1914 did not give the
board of estimate authority to amend the zoning regulations which
it was permitted to enact pursuant thereto. That essential power
"to amend, supplement and change such regulations" was granted
by the state legislature after the commission submitted its tentative
draft of the building zone resolution but before its final report. 24
Three maps of the city were incorporated iji the building zone
resolution and furnished -the basis for its provisions. The Use
District map provided for three district classifications; the
-- The board of estimate and apportionment passed its resolution to have
a Zoning Commission on May 22, 1914. It was appointed June 26, 1914. There
were seventeen members; Edward M. Bassett was chairman and Robert H.
Witten was secretary.
3 N. Y. Laws 1914, ch. 470, amended Greater New York Charter by add-
ing §§242-a and 242-b (Board of Estimate and Apportionment: Power to
regulate heights of buildings, and as to -location of industries and buildings).
N. Y. Laws 1916, ch. 503, added, inter alia, ch. XIV-A to the Charter, abolish-
ing the board of examiners and providing for the constitution and appoint-
ment of a board of standards and appeals and a board of appeals, defining
the jurisidiction and powers and procedure and prescribing penalties and court
review by writ of certiorari. (This writ has recently been replaced by the
"certiorari order." See Civil Practive Act, 1926. §§ 1283 et seq.) N. Y. Laws
1917, ch. 601, by amending § 718-d of the Charter which was added by N. Y.
Laws 1916. ch. 503, gave board of appeals power to hear and decide matters
under atv resolution adopted in pursuance of §§ 242-a and 242 b., i.e., under
the Zoning Enabling Act. N. Y. Laws 1920, bh. 348. gave the chairman of the
board of appeals power to administer oaths and compel the appearance of
witnesses. N. Y. Laws 1924. ch. 295, gave New York City remedy of enjoin-
ing violation of the zoning, ordinance. Municipal Assembly, Local Law No.
13 (1925), abolished the board of appeals and vested all powers in the board
of standards and appeals.
24 The tentative report was submitted March 10; the final report presented
on June 2, 1916. The act giving the board of estimate power to amend its
resolution was passed May 10, 1016. N. Y. Laws 1916, ch. 497.
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residence, the business and the unrestricted.2 3 In residence districts,
hotels, clubs, churches, public buildings, small private garages and
railroad passenger stations are permitted; while in business districts
forty-five enumerated trades, as well as all offensive uses, are ex-
cluded. The Height District map prescribing to what height new
buildings may rise is based upon fixed multiples of street width,
varying with the locality. Eight such multiples are now in use.
26
Provision is also made for securing increased height by means of
mansards or set-back vertical walls. The provisions for Area Dis-
tricts regulate the proportion of the lot which may be covered by a
building. Districts vary from A, waterfront and terminal property,
where use of the entire plot is permitted, to F, from which are
excluded all but detached residences .2
This brief and quite inadequate summary of the technical por-
tion of the zoning resolution is presented in the belief that it will
prove useful in examining the work of the board of appeals which
relies for its principal source of authority upon the provision that
"where there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships in
the way of carrying out the strict letter of the provisions of the
resolution the board of appeals shall have power in a specific case
to vary any such provision in harmony with its general purpose
and intent, so that the public health, safety, and general welfare
may be secured and substantial justice done." 28
II.
THE NEED, HISTORY AND JURISDICTION OF THE
BOARD OF APPEALS IN ZONING.
Necessity for a Board of Apfjeal.
The Building Zone Resolution foreshortens the field within
which an owner of property may assert the most important incident
of ownership, that of user. While such restriction upon all by a
comprehensive zone plan calculated to produce benefits to be shared
25 Building Zone Resolution, §§ 2-5. Two-thirds of the city was laid out
for residence use; two-fifths of Manhattan was reserved for this purpose;
while main thoroughfares, transit streets and others adaptable for stores or
showrooms were denominated business streets.
26 Ibid. § 8; also § 8 of Resolution of Oct. 24, 1924.
27 Ibid. §§ 10-18.
21Ibid. §20 (changed in 1924 to § 21).
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in common is justifiable under the police power, there remains the
danger that as to any particular property owner the prohibitions
and regulations may prove arbitrary and therefore confiscatory.
This danger may have its source in the physical relation of any
particular piece of land to the surrounding property, or in its
economic relation to that neighborhood property or to a combina-
tion of both. One who was largely responsible for the final form
of the law said: ". . . every builder knows that exceptional sit-
uations will arise where the written rule fails to provide the right
thing in a specific case. No words of a written law can prescribe
what ought be done in the thousands of exceptions which can arise
in the construction and use of buildings." 1
The process of introducing the vital element of flexibility was
two-fold; first, to make the zoning ordinance flexible in its terms
by enumerating the important forseeable exceptions; 2 secondly, to
create administrative machinery for enforcement with capacity to
deal with all exceptional cases whether enumerated or not. Before
we go into the reasons why the accomplishment of these purposes
was entrusted to an administrative board with large discretionary
powers, it must be noted that adjustability of the zoning resolution
was essential not as an attribute of good zoning, or a corrective of
had zoning, but as a quality of constitutional zoning."
"'The Board of Appeals in Zoning," by Edward M. Bassett (2d ed.,
1921), S.
2 See § 7 of the Buildiig Zone Resolution.
"If in any zoning ordinance there is not created a board of appeals ...
the courts, bound by the duty to protect individuals from invasion of their
constitutional rights, would develop %a line of decisions which by reason of
their number and character might eventually destroy the policy of zoning
itself." In the Matter of St. Basil's Church v. Kerner, 125 Misc. 526, 533,
211 N. Y. Supp. 470 (1j925).. Similarly, the court in Wellerup v. Village of
Hempstead, 120 Misc. 485, 489, 199 N. Y. Supp. 56, after declaring a zoning
ordinance void as applied to the plaintiffs premises, called attention to the
fact that the law failed to provide for an "appeal to any official or board of
appeals for relief from any grievance which is deemed to exist by virtue of the
passage of the ordinance," and as a result "the court is required to consider
the facts involved-in the case with greater care to see that no injustice has
been attempted than if the property owner were in a position where he might
appeal to a local board having power to vary the literal requirement of the
law in individual cases of buildings where unnecessary and excessive hardship
is caused." It is believed that provision for such a board would have saved
the Mt. Vernon ordinance declared invalid in Hecht-Dann Construction Co.
z. Burden, 124 Misc. 632, 208 N. Y. Supp. 299 (1924).
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The writings of Edward M. Bassett, the chairman of the zoning
commission, reveal two distinct reasons for choosing a board of ap-
peals as the agency for avoiding adverse decisions on constitu-
tionality. The first is rooted in practical considerations, the second
is prompted by legislative strategy. Let us examine each.
A lot may require exceptional treatment because of its topo-
graphy, its size, its location on the boundary line between two use
districts, its division by such boundary, or its peculiar value. In
these situations strict enforcement of zoning restrictions may be ar-
bitrary either because they would prevent the owner from erecting
any building at all on his peculiarly shaped lot, or because what can
be erected in conformity with the law would yield a return alto-
gether disproportionate to the value of the land.4  But where con-
stitutional rights of the individual compel compromise of zoning
principles, that should be entrusted to an instrument of administra-
tion adjusting those rights without impairment to the zone plan as
a whole. Since this requires affirmative supervision, expert knowl-
edge and judgment, it was conceived that such discretion had best
be vested with a board. A way may be devised to allow the owner
4 That the authorized use would yield a return disproportionate to the
value of the land was the main ground for upholding a variance under a sec-
tion similar in wording to § 21 of the present New York Building Zone Reso-
lution in Norcross v. Board of Appeal, 150 N. . 87 (1926). And compare
this case. 0 could not legally build an apartment house where he wished.
He demonstrated to the board that he could make a better return if he were
allowed to build such apartment house. The board granted his application.
Held, the board went beyond its authority because 0 did not prove that an
authoriked use would not yield a fair return. In the Matter of Stevens v.
Clark, 213 N. Y. Supp. 350 (Sup. Ct.). aff'd, 216 App. Div. 351, 215 N. Y.
Supp. 190.
r, That such affirmative supervision and discretion had best be put in a
board was expressed many times in the New York Courts. People ex rel.
Broadway Realty Co. v. Walsh, 203 App. Div. 468, 474, 196 N. Y. Supp. 672
(1922); People ex rel. Beinert v. Miller, 188 App. Div. 113, 117, 176 N. Y.
Supp. 398 (1919). Perhaps the language of the latter case is significant in
that this was the first time a court dealt with the zoning ordinance in con-
nection with the board of appeals. The board's decision was annulled at
Special Term, ind in reinstating that decision it was said: "The complexity
of our modern. social system and the impracticability of direct control over
the application of general rules of law by the law-making body, have in a
degree relaxed the strict application of the doctrine (of delegatus non potest
delegare) where public rights are concerned. . . . It would be physically im-
possible for the board of estimate and apportionment ... itself to determine
and vary the application of use district regulations as provided by section
seven of the resolution."
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reasonable use of and incorn from his land and nevertheless pre-
serve the character of the zoned area by the imposition of suitable
conditions. A well known architect, expressing his satisfaction with
the Fisk building, explains the part that the board of appeals played
in attaining its fine balance:
"But the architects went to the Board of Appeals which
is purposely arranged so that such matters can be laid before
it and they compromised the matter by asking for a slight in-
crease of height here, a slightly less height there, a greater
space here and a little less space there, and balanced the
building; so that it now has a very effective architectural
appearance, and yet comes within that adjustment. For-
tunately, the Board of Appeals is there for just that purpose
of making the law sufficiently elastic to suit the various con-
ditions that arise in a city like New York." 8
A district is "business" or "residence" not because all the build-
ings are devoted to those uses, but because most of them are. Those
whose property is put to -non-conforming use have interests that
must be protected. Repair, replacement, or extension of such prop-
erty may be necessary. An administrative board has for its task
to adjust these interests in a way not inimical to the welfare of the
predominant use in the district. Here too discretion and judgment
in the light of what is in harmony with the purpose of the Building
Zone Resolution are essential to resolve these competing interests,
to direct the nature of the new uses which are sought to be in-
troduced.
We come now to the second reason for the board of appeals.
Even if it were not impractical for the Building Zone Resolution to
contain numerous general exceptions or for the board of estimate
itself to make changes in the law in particular instances, a property
owner could nevertheless directly raise the question of constitu-
tionality. And in the pioneer days of zoning, it was important to
prevent the court from dealing directly with that question, viz.: Is
0 Housing Problems in America (1923). "What the Architect Thinks of
Zoning," by Harvey W. Corbett, p. 238. See also an article, "Influence
of Zoning on the Design of a Telephone Plant," by Albert P. Allen, p. 237,
Proceedings of the American Society of Civil Engineers (192S).
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this act constitutional as to this plaintiff? 7  The leading figure in
the zoning movement in the United States feared the exceptional
situations because they had "dynamite in them." 8 The interposition
of an administrative board was an effective "safety valve" because
it is well settled that the plaintiff must first exhaust all his legal
remedies before mandamus will issue against an administrative
officer. In People ex rel. Sondern v. Walsh, mandamus was denied
on the ground that:
. .. the unrelenting rule of judicial courts is not
to rush to mandamus administrative officials until all of their
machinery for action has been tried and found wanting by
the aggrieved party."9
And if the aggrieved party does first obtain a decision from the
board, the zoning law is not endangered by judicial review thereof,
for the case turns not on the constitutional validity of the property
restriction, but on whether the board had jurisdiction to act and
whether its action was not in abuse of its discretion. But this board
which it was found necessary to create in order to preserve the Build-
ing Zone Resolution against constitutional attack is itself subject .to
7 From this point of view it seems rather fortunate that the first time the
Court of Appeals had to deal with the Building Zone Resolution, it was only
as a question collateral to the main one, namely, whether the defendant could
defeat a bill for specific performance of his contract to buy land on the
ground that the Building Zone Resolution was an incumbrance thereon. In
reply to that question, McLaughlin, J., said: "In a great metropolis like New
York, in which the public health, welfare, convenience and common good are
to be considered, I am of the opinion that the resolution was not an incum-
brance, since it was a proper exercise of the police power." Lincoln Trust
Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 229 N. Y. 313, 317, re'7g, 183 App. Div. 225.
8 Edward M. Bassett, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 6, 7.
9 108 Misc. 193, 178 N. Y. Supp. 192. To say that the board of appeals is
a safety valve is really to assume that the provisions of the zoning act are
considered constitutional by the court and that the board of appeals is there
to avoid hard cases. Therefore, where the court is otherwise inclined, the
safety valve will not avert disaster; it will not even postpone it. for if the law
is unconstitutional, mandamus against the officer will issue whether or not
the plaintiff resorted to the board. This is illustrated by the New Jersey
decisions. Prince v. Board of Adjustment, 129 At. 123 (1925); Land Co. v.
Board of Adjustment of Newark, 133 At. 413 (1926); Warner v. Board, 132
At. 206 (1926); Rudensky v. Board, 131 Atl. 906 (1926). But where the
plaintiff relies not on the unconstitutionality of the law but on the fact that
the building allowed by the board will be a "public menace," then mandamus
is not the proper remedy even in New Jersey; that finding of fact by the
board is reviewable only on writ of certiorari. Chancellor Dev. Corp. v.
Senior, 134 Atl. 337 (1926).
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constitutional limitations.1 There must be reasonable notice to in-
terested parties. It must furnish them a fair opportunity to be
heard. Some form of judicial control of administrative action must
be provided." What is necessary to make the creation of such a
board by the city proper? What powers may be granted it? What
shall be its structure, its personnel? The answers that the legislature
and the board of estimate and apportionment furnished to these
questions will next engage our attention.
History of the Board of Appeals in Zoning.
The Buildings Heights Commission which was responsible for
the amendments to the Charter which enabled the city to formulate
the zone maps and regulations omitted two things: first, to give
the board of estimate and apportionment power to amend the maps
and ordinance; secondly, to provide an agency for adjustment.
Section 14 of the tentative draft of the Building Zone Resolu-
tion first provided for an appeal, appeals to the board of examiners.1 2
Two months after this preliminary draft was submitted and
less than a month before the final draft of June 2, 1916, was
adopted, the legislature abolished the board of examiners which was
to A Baltimore zoning ordinance which gave the board power to grant any
permit upon appeal from the superintendent of buildings except when the
erection of that building would be a public menace, was declared invalid.
The court stated its reason as follows: ".... whilst it was within the power
of the mayor and city council to protect 'the public welfare by adopting legisla-
tion forbidding uses which would conflict with it, it was not within its power
to delegate to an official or a board the power to do that." Tighe v. Osborne,
131 AtI. 801, 805 (1926), per Offutt, J. Similarly a permit to build a moving
picture theatre on condition "that the consent be obtained of the authorities
of St. Margaret's Church .. which is directly opposite" is "fatally defective
on its face" because this governmental function cannot be placed in the hands
of an unofficial body. Wertheimer v. Schwab, 124 Misc. 825, 210 N. Y. Supp.
312 (1925). And when a proper board is appointed, mere notice will not be
enough, for "no provision is made to inform the interested parties concerning
the subject-matter to be considered; and consequently such parties are not
sufficiently informed." In re Cobb, 217 N. Y. Supp. 593, 594 (1926).
L, In the Wigmore-Freund controversy as -to whether reduction or control
of administrative discretion is more desirable, Wigmore said: "The bestowal
of administrative discretion, as contrasted with the limitation of power by a
meticulous chain-work of inflexible detailed rules, is the best hope for govern-
mental efficiency. What is needed only is not reduction, but control nf dis-
cretion." 19 Ill. L Rev., 440, 441.
12 Zoning Commission, Tentative Report, p. 30.
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of little usefulness and in its place created two boards,1 the board
of standards and appeals and the board of appeals which were given
larger discretionary powers in the enforcement of the building laws
of the city.
The final draft therefore omitted all reference to the board of
examiners and instead named the board of appeals created by New
York Laws 1916, ch. 503. People ex rel. Beinert v. Miller pointed
out the error of supposing that the city to which- the power to adopt
a zone plan was delegated could itself delegate to "an inferior board
the power to dispense in its discretion with compliance with such
regulations." 14 Pending the decision of that case, however, the
appropriate Charter provisions were amended. To the paragraph
authorizing the city to have a zone plan was added a power to refer
matters to a board of appeals; to the provisions creating the board
of appeals for enforcing the building law was added a clause per-
mitting the board also to decide such cases as the zoning ordinance
may refer to it." The net result of the error was the cumbersome
arrangement of distinct but interrelated boards, namely, the board
of standards and appeals and the board of appeals. Both had the
same chairman, the same rules of procedure, and similar duties in
the enforcement of different but related ordinances. And it was
not until three years ago that the board of appeals was abolished and
the powers of both boards given to the board of standards and
appeals.'0
Jurisdiction of the Board.
1. The enabling provisions.
The discarded boat d of examiners which existed under section
411 of the Greater New York Charter bad power to reverse the
superintendent of buildings when he incorrectly applied the law,
but it had not discretion to grant a permit for the erection of a
building according to plans which were not in strict compliance
13 N.'Y. Laws 1916, ch. 503.
14 100 Misc. 31& The court cited Birdsall v. Clark, 73 N. Y. 73; Phelps
v. City of New York. 112 N. Y. 216. 220; Ontario Knitting Co. v. Stat, 205
N. Y. 409, 416.
1 GGreater New York Charter, §§ 242-a and 242-b, and § 718-d as amended
by N. Y. Laws 1916, ch. 601.
is Municipal Assembly, Local Law No. 13 (1925).
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with the law.'7 In its place, as we have seen, the legislature, by the
addition of chapter 14-A to the Charter, placed the board of
standards and appeals and the board of appeals. We must examine
the jurisdiction delegated to the latter because the erroneous as-
sumption of the Zoning Commission that such delegation was broad
enough to take care of the enforcement of the zoning resolution was
corrected merely by an addition of a sentence to the effect that this
board shall also have jurisdiction over matters referred to it by the
zoning ordinance.
Two independent grounds of jurisdiction were granted to the
board of appeals:
(1) Power to hear appeals from any order, requirement, de-
cision, made by a superintendent of buildings or by the fire com-
missioner, and to make such ordek, etc., as in its opinion ought to be
made in the premises.
(2) Power to vary or modify any rule or ordinance relating
to the construction, structural change, removal or use of buildings.
Under the first power the board could reverse or affirm or mod-
ify the official's order and to that end had all the powers of the
officer from whom the appeal was taken. In pursuance of its sec-
ond power the board could act only "where there are practical dif-
ficulties or unnecessary hardship in the way of carrying out the strict
letter of the law . . . and its variation or modification was
to be made to the end . . . that the spirit of the law shall be
observed, public safety secured and substantial justice done." 18
In order to give the board of appeals jurisdiction over zoning
matters, the act "to amend the Greater New York Charter in rela-
tion to the enforcement of the buildings district regulations of the
1l Altschul v. Ludwig, 216 N. Y. 459, 116 N. E. 216 (1916). Under the
first Illinois zoning act, cities 'which adopted zoning were required to have a
board of appeals which had power to recommend variations which could be
effected only by ordinance. There was no power of adjustment. Ill. Laws
(1921), 180, 181. After considerable agitation conducted by the Chicago Real
Estate Board, an amendment was adopted to bring the law in accordance with
the provisions for a board of appeals in the New York ordinance. Ill. Laws(1923), 268.
Is New York Charter, § 719-5. An apt illustration of the distinction be-
tween the two kinds of relief that the board is empowered to give is Leverich
Realty Corp. v. Walsh, N. Y. L J., March 3, 1925, at 2095. Though the
board was specifically denied power to hear appeals from the Tenement House
Commission, it had original jurisdiction to "vary" the application of the law.
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board of estimate and apportionment," passed May 22, 1917,' 9 added
but one sentenice to section 718-d, namely-"They (the members of
the board of appeals) shall also hear and decide all matters referred
to them 20 or upon which they are required to pass under any
resolution of the board of estimate adopted pursuant to section 242-a
and section 242-b of this Chapter."
2. Jurisdiction of the board under the ordinance.
The first Building Zone Resolution of July 25, 1916-and those
that were enacted since-place two classes of cases within the
board's power, both of which fall within the original jurisdiction of
the board. A third class, namely, appellate jurisdiction to correct
the errors of administrative officials who pass on the applications
for permits, is carried over directly from the Charter and was dis-
cussed above. Insofar as the board deals with these appeals, it
continues to function in the same manner as the old board of
examiners; no variation in the application of the law is involved. The
other powers do not, of course, enable the board to effect changes
in the law. That power was granted to the board of estimate and
apportionment by the state legislature. But the board may make
adjustments in the application of the law. It may do so in two types
of situations:
(1) A petitioner may appeal to the board to have it declare
that his request falls within one or more of the exceptions set forth
in the zoning law.
(2) A petitioner may apply to the board for a variation in
the literal application of the law because practical difficulties or un-
necessary hardship stand in the way of strict enforcement although
the case is not covered by one of the enumerated exceptions.
Perhaps it will be profitable to say a word as to each at this
point.
(1) The enumerated exceptions. "The board of appeals
may in appropriate cases, after public notice and hearing, and sub-
29 Supra, note 13.
20 The use of the third person plural is explained by the fact that the board
of appeals was constituted by naming five persons on the larger board of
standards and appeals. This peculiarity was finally removed by Local Law
No. 13 (1925), which consolidated the boards and removed the superintend-
ents of buildings in the five boroughs from the new board of standards and
appeals.
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ject to appropriate conditions and safeguards, determine and vary
the application of the use district regulations . . . in harmony
with their general purpose and intent as follows ,, 21 That
section then goes on to enumerate seven exceptional situations, the
general nature of which has been indicated in the first part of this
chapter and of which more will be said later on, when judicial con-
trol of the board is discussed.
While the power to determine whether an applicant establishes
the facts that bring him within one or the other of the expressed
exceptions is rather narrow, the field of discretion as to the form
of relief to be given him after he succeeds in so doing is very wide.
The board may "determine" what are "appropriate conditions and
safeguards ;" the nature and extent of such exactions will be gov-
erned by its judgment of what is necessary to bring the result of
the variation in harmony with the general purpose and intent of the
use district provisions.2 2 The interrelation of these exceptional situa-
tions to each other and to those within the wider power of the board,
i.e., those of unnecessary hardship will also be discussed later.
,(2) The general power to grant variations. Section 21 .8 of
the Building Zone Resolution which has been interpreted as being
practically identical 24 with the charter provision discussed above
is the most important source of the board's power. And it is the
one that has caused the most trouble. Its generality is both its
strength and its weakness.22  What is practical difficulty? What is
21 Building Zone Resolution, § 7.
22 In People ex rel. Sheldon et al. v. Board of Appeals, 234 N. Y. 313,
which was the first important decision involving the interpretation of § 7 and
the board's power thereunder, counsel successfully argued that the board's
jurisdiction under § 7 was quasi-judicial in character, i.e., to "determine"
whether there is unnecessary hardship. If it finds that there is, then it has the
further power to vary subject to suitable conditions. See Brief of Cadwal-
ader, Wickersham & Taft for the Farmers' Loan & Tust Co., Trustee. inter-
venor-appellant, pp. 26, 31.
23 In the original Building Zone Resolution (1916) this was § 20. It was
first numbered 21 in the Building Zone Resolution of 1924. In the interim
there were two amendments to that section on Dec. 6 and 19, 1919, -with which
we are not concerned here. See Cosby's Code of Ordinances (1925), 639,
640, 642. 651.
"2 People ex rel. Cotton v. Leo, 110 Misc. 519, 180 N. Y. Supp. 554 (1920).
-5 On June 16, 1916, the Zoning Commission heard a report of a sub-
committee appointed to consider the administration and technical features of
the proposed plan as affecting building development. This sub-committee was
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unnecessary hardship? We shall return to these questions when we
examine the cases to see how far the board is allowed to go in
taking jurisdiction under this section; how quick the court is in
checking abuse in its use and how (with all limitations considered)
powerful an instrument it is for achieving the general purpose of the
act and doing substantial justice in specific instances.2 6
composed of Rudolph P. Miller (the first chairman of the board of appeals),
the five building superintendents, the Tenement House Commissioner, the
Fire Commissioner, John P. O'Brien-Assistant Corporation Counsel, and
the Consultant Secretary of the Committee on the city plan.
Oddly enough, this committee, composed of men who were to have a great
deal to do with these matters because of their membership in the board of
standards and appeals, recommended that § 20, the greatest source of power
to the board of appeals, be dropped as unnecessary. (Section 20, entitled
"Rules and Regulations; Modifications of Provisions," is not § 21.)
Nothing was said of § 7. But the report of the sub-committee states that
"Your committee was directed to consider the resolution with special refer-
ence to Article IV, containing the general and administrative provisions. The
committee has not had an opportunity to take up in detail the other articles
of the resolution." In other words, § 7 was not studied by the sub-committee.
See the Final Report of the Zoning Commission, p. 230, the report of the
committee beginning at p. 213.
26 The object of seeking to control city mobility as discussed in the first
chapter is, in large measure, entrusted to the board of appeals. Thus § 7 (h)
gives' it power to "grant in undeveloped sections of the city temporary and
conditional permits for not more than two years for structures and uses in
contravention of the requirements of this article." Section 21 contains this
sentence: "Where the street layout actually on the ground varies from the
street layout as shown on the amended use, height or area district map, the
designation shown on the mapped areas shall be applied by the Board of
Appeals to the unmapped streets in such a way as to carry out the intent and
purpose of the plan for the particular section in question. Before taking
action authorized in this section the Board of Appeals shall give public notice
and hearing." In addition may be mentioned that the board is required by
§ 718-1-5 of the Charter to make annual suggestions to the Mayor concerning
the amendments to the zoning resolution. Still further powers of this sort
seem contemplated by the recent New York enabling act for city planning.
Appeals from the decisions of the administrative officer acting thereunder are
allowed to the same board that the city authorized to hear zoning appeals.
The methods of court review are the same as in zoning. See N. Y. Stat.
(1926), ch. 690, § 36 and ch. 719 for towns. Both are based on the model act
to be found in a pamphlet issued by the Regional Plan of New York and its
Environs Commission. It is entitled "Planning of Unbuilt Areas in the New
York Region, a Form of State Enabling Act with Annotation." It is by
Edward M. Bassett,
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III.
ORGANIZArION AND PERSONNEL OF TIE ).\RD
OF APPEALS.
.The Original Board of Appeals in Zonin.q.
The board originally created by the Charter had seven mem-
bers; the six appointed members of the board of standards and ap-
peals and the chief of the uniformed force of the fire department.
Meetings of the board were open to the public. Records of the
proceedings, votes and other official action were filed in the office
of the board and available for inspection by the public. The board
was also required to publish its decisions and reasons therefor, to-
gether with any other material it desired, at least monthly.
The Present Board of Appeals.
The recent charter changes 1 already referred to in another
connection, and the latest Rules of Procedure 2 have departed from
the original plan of organization and personnel. The Municipal
Assembly provided for the abolition of the board of appeals and
the transfer of its powers to the board of standards and appeals as
newly constituted.
Membership.
The new board of standards and appeals which now hears
zoning appeals is smaller. Reduction in size was accomplished by
eliminating the borough superintendents of buildings. This seems
especially desirable in view of the fact that each superintendent tin-
der the former arrangement was in a sense the judge of the order
from which an appeal was taken. At present there are five mem-
bers; four appointees of the mayor and an officer above the grade
of battalion chief designated by the fire commissioner. In the event
of disability, the fire chief is to designate a substitute.
Qualifications of the Appointed cm.lers.
Of the four appointees, one is named chairman and the other
three are called "Commissioners of Standards and Appeals." Two
of the commissioners must have had at least ten years of experience
I Local Law, No. 13 (1925).
- See "Bulletin," Vol. XII, No. 8.
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as civil engineer and "employing building contractor" respectively.
No change was made in'the qualifications for the office of chairman
of the board.
Term of Office, Appointment and Removal.
Each of the appointed members serve six years, but can be re-
moved and replaced by the mayor at any time. The uniformed
officer serves withou extra pay; the others receive an annual salary.
Meetings and Records.
As to meetings and records, no changes were made other than
the interesting but minor difference in terminology. Instead of
"meeting," the wor4 "hearing" is used, and in the new Rules of




Procedure Prior to the Hearing.
Who may appeal?
The appeal to the board may be made (1) "by any person ag-
grieved;" 2 (2) by any officer, department, board or bureau of the
city. No definite criterion has been established by the board as to,
who is an aggrieved person. When an applicant assumes to get
eighty per cent. of the property owners "affected" as a basis for his
application requesting a variation, the board is given power to decide
what property it deems to be affected.3 Perhaps the class of peo-
ple so deemed to be affected may be co-terminus with the class of
aggrieved persons.
What is appealable?
Any order of the building superintendents- or of the Fire and
(by recent, amendment) the Tenement House Commissioner may be
' The new Rules of Procedure, passed Feb. 15, 1927, will be the basis for
this chapter. Discarded rules will be mentioned for purposes of comparison
and will be cited as Rules '16 or Rules '18. The new Rules are printed in
12 Bulletin, 202.
2 See Charter (N. Y.), § 719 (2).
3 Building Zone Resolution, § 7 (g).
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appealed to the board.4 Such order, requirement, decision or deter-
mination may be reversed or modified wholly or in part.
Classes of applications to the board.
There are (1) appeals from erroneous orders made by an of-
ficer; (2) applications for a variation in the application of the zon-
ing provisions.' The latter may be based on any of the exceptions
mentioned in Section 7 or on the fact of unusual difficulty or un-
necessary hardship in the enforcement of the law. While relief so
sought is different in kind from an appeal, the board will not ex-
ercise its origihal jurisdiction under Section 7 or Section 21 until
the proper officer has acted on the petitioner's request for -a permit.
What is an application ?
"Any communication purporting to be an application, appeal,
or petition shall be regarded as a mere notice of intention to seek
relief and shall be of no force or effect until it is made in the form
required." I That the board used "application" technically is
evidenced by the explicit requirement in another section of its rules
that the proper forms and other necessary data must be filed with-
in twenty days of the date of the order or decision appealed from.7
A mere communication of intent to apply to the board will not be
sufficient though made within that time.
The Clerk's Calendar: 3wtification to intercsted parties.
Upon filing of the requisite data in the form prescribed, each
case is numbered serially and placed upon the docket. Then ap-
plications for zoning variations are placed in the Clerk's Calendar
and a day is set for a hearing. Publication 6f such date in the
"Bulletin" at least two weeks in advance is considered enough to
satisfy the Charter requirement of adequate notice to interested per-
sons. To the applicant, the secretary sends a formal notification to-
4 But no appeal, application or petition will be entertained in connection
with which court proceedings are pending or in progress. 9 Bulletin, No. 1,
p. 1 (1924).
Application must be made within twenty days of the date of the official
action from which relief is sought.
6 Rules '27, Art 11, § 2.
7 Supra, note 6, Art. II, § 3. Rules '18 added that upon failure to file data
in the prescribed time "his case may be dismissed for lack of prosecution."
3 Bulletin, 673 (1918).
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gether with the form for the letters that must be furnished by the
applicant to those property owners on the block that the board deems
interested. A verified statement that they were so notified by
registered mail or personal service must be made by the petitioner
within three days after receipt of the form letters.
Call of the Clerk's Calendar.
The purpose of this preliminary hearing is to inform the parties
interested of the subject-matter of the appeal arid to give them an
opportunity to offer their objections in writing. Owners who were
personally notified and those who were notified by publication are
expected to appear at this hearing in person or by representative 8
to present documentary evidence in opposition to the petition for a
permit or a variation. All of this forms part of the evidence that
will be relied upon in the public hearing that will take place later.
The Clerk's Calendar as well as the public hearing thereon, must be
sharply distinguished from the trial or hearing calendar and the
administrative trial.
Inspections.
While the board recognizes that its action 9 will have to be
taken largely in reliance upon information furnished in the manner
described,10 it may decide to get additional facts in any case by
sending a committee of inspection. By specific provision in the
Charter, such independent gathering of evidence is authorized:
"Each member of the board and the secretary shall have
all powers to enter, inspect and examine buildings and struc-
tures, that are conferred upon a superintendent of buildings
or upon the Fire Commissioner." 11
An owner who is deemed affected must file an affidavit certifying his
ownership. While the class of people who are entitled to be deemed affected
and those who may be "aggrieved" by the grant of an application may be
co-terminus as suggested, there is no requirement that an aggrieved person file
any affidavit, and the only notice to which he is entitled as such is notice by
publication in the Bulletin.
0 With the consent of the board, an applicant may withdraw his applica-
tion before action is taken by the board. If a motion has been made but not
voted upon,, that is given preference.
10A comparison of these iegulations and the "Statement of Policy" passed
by the board Aug. 4, 1916, does not reveal any substantial difference in the
method of acquiring the data upon which the board's action must be based.
See "Building Zones" (pamphlet), by G. B. Ford, p. 19 et $eq. For safe-
guards against misinformation and delay, see infra.
11 Charter (N. Y.), § 718 (c).
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Further provisions are there made prescribing that inspections
if made at all, must be made by the chairman of the board together
with at least two members appointed by him. The committee must
report its findings to the board in writing. That the chairman of
the board and the other members who act on committees of inspec-
tion use knowledge so gained not only in connection with the case
that occasioned the inspection but in other cases involving the same
district, become., easily apparent to one attending any of its hear-
ings. While judgment based on facts within its own knowledge
may seem objectionable, the safeguard lies in the training and ex-
perience upon which the appointment of these men is conditioned. 12
This safeguard is stressed in a dictum by judge Cardozo in People
ex rel. Fordhain Manor Reformed Church v. Walsh: 13
"But the power of the board to do justice informally And
promptly is not limited to cases where witnesses have been
heard. \Vithout any witness at all, it may act of its own
knowledgc, for, as constituted by the Statute, it is made up
of men with special qualifications of training and experience.
In that event, however, it must set forth in its return the
facts known to its members, but not otherwise disclosed."
Similarly it might be urged that provision for inspection by three
out of five members of an administrative board required by'law to
decide specific cases at a public hearing is unconstitutional because
it involves an unauthorized "prejudgment" of the case. If this ar-
gument is entertained. it would again lead to the elimination of an
important reason for requiring special qualifications. The board
would be deprived of an important source of primary evidence. It
seems, therefore, that this objection must also fall. That the board
is furnished with a written copy of the findings which will be con-
sidered along with the other evidence seems a sufficient guarantee
against arbitrary action by such committee.14
12 All members of the inspection committee, save the Chairman, receive
special compensation for each inspection that is made. See also Rules '27,
Art. X.
11244 N. Y. 280. 155 N. E. 575 (1927).
14 Examples of some objectionable inspection reports are given infra at
pp. 145 et seq. As to the matter of prejudgments, there is another situation
where the objection may be raised. It is the practice of the chairman and his
staff to assist an applicant in the preparation of his papers. "Critics have
urged that applicanti sh,uhl be given no information relating to the merits
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Effect of taking an appeal to the board.
Unless the officer from whose action relief is sought certifies
to the board that a stay in the enforcement of the order pending the
appeal therefrom would endanger life and property, all proceedings
are suspended by reason of such appeal. And even if the official
does so certify, the applicant, upon showing cause, may get a re-
straining order from the board or supreme court25
The Public Hearing.
Date and notice of the administrative trial.
When the call of the Clerk's Calendar is over, the case is
marked for hearing on the "Trial" or "Hearing" calendar. At least
fourteen days' notice of that date is given by publication in the
official weekly bulletin.
Charter provisions.
The Greater New York Charter contains nothing as to the man-
ner of conducting this hearing save (1) that it shall be open to the
public, (2) that "the board of appeals shall fix a reasonable time
for the hearing of the appeal and give due notice thereof to the par-
ties and decide the same within a reasonable time," (3) that no
hearing may be held unless at least four members of the board at-
of cases in order that the matter may come up the same as before a jury.
I think that this view is too extreme. If the lot owner cannot get help at
headquarters, he has nowhere to go but to expensive specialists. On the other
hand, it is improper for any lot owner to seek help beforehand from any
member of the board except the chairman. The reason for this distinction
is * * * that the chairman has given his whole time to the work of the
board, is daily in attendance, and is the head of the office administration. He
is presumed~to be able to advise on procedure in difficult cases without preju-
dice to his later decision on the merits after public hearing. * * *" Extract
for a "release" issued by Edward M. Bassett, Counsel of the Zoning Com-
mittee, Nov. 6, 1926. In the Matter of Village of Saratoga Springs v. Sara-
toga Gas, etc., Co., 191 N. Y. 123, 148 (1908), a similar argument was dis-
posed of. It was there objected that the employees of the commission .could
make inspections and reports based on facts that are not sworn to. The court
answered that this was not unconstitutional because the commission dould be
requested to summon these witnesses and have them take oath that the state-
ments in the report were true. This could hardly be done here because the
members of the board make up the membership of the inspection committee.
is Charter § 719-14.
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tend.'6 Pursuant to its power to make necessary rules and regula-
tions. t7 the board has developed its own procedure for its "trials."
Before venturing a summary of this administrative trial technique,
the rather extensive powers of thechairman deserve special mention.
The new rules 8 give him disciplinary power over the members of
the board and those appearing before it. "Discourtesy or disorder-
ly or contemptuous conduct shall be regarded as a breach of- the
privileges bf the Board and shall be dealt with as the chairman
deems proper." A sergeant-at-arms under the direction of the chair-
man maintains "order and decorum" in the hearing room?9 and
lobbies. Subject to the contrary will of a majority of the board, the
chairman may decide all points of order and procedure. His is the
exclusive power of appointing all inspection committees of which
he nmust also be a member. The chairman also has full power to
engage and direct the employees that he deems to be necessary to
carry on the work of the office.2' A function which is nowhere men-
tioned in the provisions of the law or of the board's own rules is
that of advising applicants in filling out the proper forms and in-
dicating under which section of the zoning resolution the applica-
tion had best be made. Advice of this nature is given by the
chairman during regular consultation hours. This eliminates the
need of expert advice and brings the means of taking an appeal
within the financial reach of all. That such participation by the
chairman in formulating the case for the petitioner is objectionable
16 See Charter §§ 718 (d) and 719-5. Under similar charter provisions,
Buffalo's zoning ordinance preicribed sixteen days' notice of the hearing. But
there was not a provision for notification of the interested persons of the
subject-matter to be considered. On that account, the decision of the board
was upset. In re Cobb, 217 N. Y. Supp. 593 (1926).
'- Charter § 718 (b), 1. Any change, amendment or repeal of the rules
must be preceded by publication in the Bulletin at least ten days before and
a public 'hearing held on a fixed day. And see Rules '27, Art. VII, § 1.
is Rules '27. Art. II, §§ 5, 6. 7, on discipline are new.
"9 The room in which the public hearing are held is on the 10th floor in
the Municipal Building. It has a seating capacity for perhaps eighty people.
Inside the railing there is a crescent-shaped platform. The -chairman sits at
the farther end the members on either side. Underneath the chairman's
place arc the places for the secretary and stenographers. When the number
of their case is called, the contestants step inside the railing to argue it.
21" Charter § 718 (c) requires the chairman to be a member of every inspec-
tion committee. For other powers of the chairman, see Rules '27, Art. XV,
"Officers."
ZONING ADMINISTRATION
because it involves a "pre-judgment" has been denied by Edward M.
Bassett. His argument was previously summarized in a footnote.2'
Order of presentation.
The earliest Rules of Procedure required that any one wishing
to be heard by the board must leave his name with the secretary
beforehand. And it was provided that "Those in opposition to any
proposed action shall be heard first unless otherwise ordered by
the board.22 That has not been abandoned in favor of the more
natural procedure of allowing the petitioner to state his. case before
the arguments of the opposition are heard. The applicant then has
an opportunity to reply.
Who may appear before the Board.
Whoever is "aggrieved" by an administrative order may bring
the appeal; any person or persons "interested" have a standing as
objecting parties. It will be recalled that parties on either side are
ascertained when the Clerk's Calendar is called at which time the
objectors are obliged to submit verified statements of the facts on
which the objection is based and affidavits of property ownership.
Lawyers are usually employed to appear, but not infrequently archi-
tects and others trained in building matters represent the contestants.
It is quite common for the opposition, fired with the ambition to
make a "grand showing" that a "high class" neighborhood is in-
volved, to produce a crowd of property owners (middle aged women
and old men usually) who proudly arise in a body as their repre-
sentative is called on to state his case. Of course, one or two will
be asked a question by the chairman about the character of the
district perhaps, or the effect of the proposed building on a particu-
lar piece of property adjoining or on the other side of the street.
But the presence of these people, while not objectionable, does not
have its intended effect on the board.2 a
21 Supra, note 12.
22 The first Rules of Procedure were adopted July 28, 1916. See "Building
Zones," by George B. Ford, at 19 et seq. They were of no effect " * * * be-
cause the board of appeals had not power to make rules governing the opera-
tion of the building zone resolution until the enactment of Chapter 601 of
Laws of 1917." People ex rel. West Side Mortgage Co. v. Leo, 174 N. Y.
Supp. 451, 459.
28 "The board of appeals is not a legislative body like the board of estimate.
It is more like a court. Whatever reason may exist for crowds turning out
before the board of estimate does not exist in the case of the board of
appeals. What the board of appeals wants are the facts." "Crowds Not
Necessary at Hearings," a release by Edward M. Bassett, Dec. 22, 1923.
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Evidenwe.
Problems as to the retention, abrogation or modification of the
common law evidentiary rules by an administrative board which, in
the conduct of elaborate investigations of facts, must rely on wit-
nesses, are not present here. Though the chairman of the board has
the power to administer oaths and compel the attendance of wit-
nesses,24 that is rarely done. The explanation lies in the nature of
the facts upon which the board must predicate its action. What
the board needs to know is the location of the land or building
involved, its present use, the contemplated use, the nature and use
of the surrounding property, the attitude of the property owners
toward the proposed structure, the financial consequences of denying
the petitioner's request for a variation in the literal enforcement of
the law. Those are the facts. What conclusion will follow depends
first upon whether the established facts bring the case within any
of the exceptions enumerated in Section seven or within the general
power under Section 21 and then, upon whether the board decides
this to be an appropriate case in which to exercise its jurisdiction.
It becomes apparent then, that the best means of acquiring the
essential facts are: (1) Documentary evidence consisting of maps,
plans, photographs-copies of which must be furnished to each
member of the board; (2) written reports by committees of inspec-
tion; (3) facts known independently by members of the board. In
People ex rel. Fordham Manor Reformed Church v. Walsh,2" the
Court of Appeals annulled a determination of the board and sent
the case back to the board because the record did not indicate either
the facts proven or the facts independently known to the board
from which the conclusion arrived at could be inferred. But the
general method of acquiring evidence was approved:
"The statements of the witnesses do not have to comply
with the technical requirements applicable to testimony in
court. They are not even under oath. It is enough that
reasonable men could view them as entitled to probative
effect. * * * Without any witnesses at all, it may act of its
own knowledge."
24A provision to that effect was added to §718-3 of the Greater New York




The board's "final determination."
Originally the board consisted of six appointed members and
the chief of the Fire Department. It was provided that:
"Hearings on appeals shall be before at least five mem-
bers of the board of appeals, and the concurring vote of five
members of the board of appeals shall be necessary to a
decision." 26
But what is a "decision"? If the customary meaning of the word
were applied, there would not be a final disposition of the case unless
five votes were cast for or against the applicant. But though the
court in People ex rel. New York Central Co. v. Leo 27 criticized
the ambiguity of the Charter provision, it took a different view of
what "decision" meant. It was there argued that the normal use
of the word would lead to a situation where an applicant receiving
four votes in his favor and two votes against him was worse off than
one whose application was denied by a vote of five to one; the
latter could immediately seek court review, whereas the former
needed to wait for a final 28 disposition of the case. The provision
was, therefore, taken to mean that an application failing to receive
five concurring votes in its favor is deemed to be denied. Though
it was hardly necessary to do so, this construction was rested,
inferentially at least, upon the assumption that the board's function
was not judicial in nature.29 A less technical explanation and one
more consistent with the later cases which emphatically declare
that the board of appeals is a quasi-judicial body, was offered by
Edward M. Bassett.
"Inasmuch as exceptional situations only come before
a board of appeals there is always a presumption that the
20Charter §718-d.
27 105 Misc. 372. 173 N. Y. Supp. 217 (1918). Apld see also People ex rel.
Cockroft v. Miller, 187 App. Div. 714, 176 N. Y. Supp. 206 (1919).
28 The court will not review the proceedings before the board unless there
has been a final determination. People ex rel. West Side Mortgage Co. v.
Leo, 174 N. Y. Supp. 451 (1919).
29 "It is true this construction is not in accordance with the customary
method of determining appeal in judicial proceedings, but I know of no reason
why the Legislature should necessarily follow such customary methods in the
case of appeals of the kind provided for in the statute now under considera-
tion." New York Central Co. v. Leo, supra, note 27, 173 N. Y. Supp. at 219
(per Giegerich, J.).
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applicant should observe the strict letter of the zoning ordi-
nance just the same as all other citizens. Therefore if an
exception is to be made in his case, the vote of the board
should be greater than a mere majority. In other words, an
applicant desiring an exception should be able to convince
a large proportion of the board. On the other hand it should
be possible for a mere majority to refuse to make an excep-
tion so that there may be a decision of denial on which the
applicant can ask for a court review." 3 0
When the Charter provisions were amended, the clause was
changed to conform with the view expressed by the court.3' If a
hearing is held before four members only and the applicant received
three votes in his favor, the case will be laid over to be heard again
before the full board; if the vote is two in favor and two against
the applicant, the action will be equivalent to a denial because the
fifth member could not change the result.32
Reconsideration and rehearing; administrative fiiality.
It seems clear that the board should have power over its own
determinations to the extent of making changes in the wording 33
or. even in the nature or extent of the safe-guarding conditions. Of
course, the board's action ought not prejudice the applicant who
had already suffered a change of position in reliance upon the
determination as granted. Considerations of fairness support pro-
visions for a rehearing upon the presentation of new evidence. The
• '1 "The Board of Appeals in Zoning," p. 22.
31. "The concurring vote of four members of the board shall be necessary
to reverse or modify any order, regulation, decision, or determination, or to a
decision in favor of an applicant upon any matter upon which the board is
required to pass under any law, ordinance or resolution, or to effect any
variation in such law, ordinance or resolution. * * *" Municipal Assembly,
Local Law No. 13 (1925).
"12Rules '27, Art. IV, § 7. But under a statute that requires the concur-
ring vote of three of the five members for a final disposition, an even division
when only four are present ought not be deemed a denial, because the vote of
the fifth would make a difference and the applicant is entitled to a hearing
before the full boar l. It is submitted, therefore, that Richard v. Zoning
Board of Review, 130 Atl. 802 (R. I.), reached an unfortunate result.
33 It was held- that the board had power to correct a clerical error in its
decision without a rehearing. Barker v. Boettger, 124 Misc. 461, 208 N. Y.
Supp. 295 (1924). And see People ex rel. Flengenheimer v. Walsh, N. Y.
L. J., decided April 27, 1918, at 328, where an injunction was denied because
the irregularity in the board's decision was of no consequence.
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engineers will report on the new data, the request for rehearing
will be presented to the board, and if four of the five members
approve, the case will be set for "calendar call" and from then on,
the same procedure is followed as in the ordinary proceedings
preliminary to the first public hearing.
3 4
Serious difficulty was encountered by the board when it essayed
to control its final decision in a case for purposes other than to
change its wording or qualifying conditions, or to grant a rehearing
on the basis of new evidence. The rules of procedure adopted
June 6, 1918, and continuing until the adoption of the new rules
February 15, 1927, provided as follows:35
"No application, appeal or petition dismissed or denied
can be considered again except (1) on motion to reconsider
the vote or (2) on request for a rehearing."
The word "rehearing," it appears, was used with reference to a
situation where the petitioner offered new evidence and need not
detain us longer. In an explanatory sentence of the -ules, it was
said that:
"No motion to reconsider can be entertained unless it
is made by a member of the board who voted against the
application * * * (and if such motion is passed) * * * the
case must be put on the calendar for a public hearing."
And in another paragraph on this point, it was stated that:
"Either board may, on the motion of any member, review
any decision that it has made, and may reverse or modify such
decision, but no such review shall prejudice the rights of any
person who has in good faith acted thereon before it is
reversed or modified." 30
Before we go on to see the effect of three court decisions on the
question of reconsideration and rehearing, it must be observed that
the last quoted paragraph adds a third way for the board to deal
with a case that it had previously decided.
An answer to two questions is sought: (1) Has the board
power to "reconsider" its final determination, viz., to grant a rehear-
ing in the absence of new evidence? (2) Has the board power to
34 Rules '27, Art. IV, § 5.
34 Rules '18, Art. IV, §§ 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. 3 Bulletin, No. 23, p. 674.
-"It will be recalled that up to 1925 these rules governed the board of
standards and appeals as well as the board of appeals.
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"review" its decision upon motion by any member? An affirmative
answer was given to the first question in People exr rel. Brennan v.
Walsh.37  Judge Callaghan, speaking for the Special Term, ex-
pressed his reasons in this manner:
"The Board of Appeals is a quasi judicial body and
should not ordinarily be permitted to sit in review of its own
decisions and revoke action once duly taken. * * * But,
having regard for the power granted to the Board of Appeals
by the Building Zone Resolution with the idea of bringing
about a uniformity of building, * * * it seems more reason-
ab'le to concl.de that there is power to recall and correct
orders than to hold that the sole method of correcting is in
courts through a writ of certiorari." 38
A year later the question came up before the same court and Judge
in People e.r rel. Swedish Hospital v. Leo3" and was decided the
other way. Judge Callaghan frankly reversed his position stating
that absence of finality in administrative proceedings makes the
contrary position untenable.4 1 In the second case, the learned judge
believed the quasi-judicial nature of the board's jurisdiction com-
pelled a negative answer to the question of whether it may reopen
and redetermine a case on the same evidence. Matter of Equitable
Trust Co. v. Hamilton4 ' relied upon in the previous opinion to reach
the opposite result, was distinguished on the ground that the rehear-
ing of a claim was proper because the audit of a claim by the board
of supervisors is administrative rather than judicial. On the other
hand, it was said:
"The board of appeals can in no sense act other than in
a quasi judicial capacity. It does not perform a single
administrative or legislative act. As its name implied it is
an appellate tribunal. It passes upon matters formally
brought to its attention much the same as courts. It hears
37 195 N. Y. Supp. 264 (1922).
3s Supra, note 37, at 266. The court relied largely upon Matter of Equi-
table Trust Co. -,. I lamilton, 226 N. Y. 241, 123 N. E. 380.
39120 Misc. 355, 198 N. Y. Snpp. 399 (1923).
4,, "In People ex rel. Brennan z. Walsh, a contrary view was expressed,
but pride of opinion does not compel an adherence to a decision which incor-
rectly states the law." Supra, note 39, at 359.
-1 Supra, note 38.
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evidence and argument and decides controversies as the
evidence dictates." 42
When in yet another case, the Appellate Division dealt with the
question, 3 it was urged in support of the board's power to "rehear"
a case on the same evidence that the board was not acting as a
quasi-judicial tribunal but in a purely administrative capacity of
enforcing the law in an exceptional rather than ordinary manner
in special situations. But this was rejected and People ex rel.
Swedish Hospital v. Leo was held to control. Then an altogether
new attack was attempted. It was argued that the Charter author-
ized the board to review its decision in that it was there provided
that
"Any rule * * * order * * * decision, from which an
appeal may be taken to the board of appeals may be reviewed
by the board of appeals upon motion of any member thereof,
but no such review of a decision upon an appeal shall preju-
dice the rights of any person who has in good faith acted
thereon before it is reversed or modified." 44
Judge Manning rejected the argument that this provision justified
the board in rehearing a case that it had finally disposed of, by
saying: 45
"As I interpret the section, a review may be had by
appeal from a decision or determination of the superintendent
of buildings upon motion of any member of the board of
appeals, but I do not believe it confers the power on the
board of appeals to review of its own free will an appeal once
heard and determined by the board itself in what appears to
me a quasi-judicial manner and not in an administrative
manner as asserted, where the Charter provides certiorari for
such purpose."
42 Supra, note 39, at 359, 360. The statement which is frequently quoted is
slightly misleading because the board is not entirely an appellate board. "The
application to the board, though called an appeal, is not strictly such, but is a
matter of its original jurisdiction." People ex rel. Kannensohn Holding Corp.
'. Walsh, 120 Misc. 469, 199 N. Y. Supp. 534 (1923).
43Matter of McGarry v. Walsh, 213 App. Div. 289 (1925). It is interest-
ing to note that the board was not impressed with the dignified appellation
'quasi-judicial body."
44 Charter § 719 (6).
45 213 App. Div. at 297.
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It will be observed that Judge Manning answered our second
question (i.e., has the board power to review its own decisions?)
in the negative. The board has neither the power to rehear upon
motion.of the applicant or to review upon motion by one of its
members, any .case that it has once disposed of unless there is new
evidence. In view of these decisions, the board of appeals in formu-
lating its new. rules omitted entirely the paragraph about "recon-
sideration," but retained the provision previously quoted, to the
effect that "the board may, on the motion of any member review
any decision that it has made.46 Matter of McGarry v. Walsh which
held that the board did not have that power, was decided two years
before these Rules of Procedure were adopted by the board. Simi-
larity in phrasing reveals that the Charter provision allowing a
member of the board as well as any aggrieved person to initiate
proceedings to change or reverse an order of the superintendent of
buildings or other official, was erroneously understood by the board
to allow it to review "any decision that it has made" upon such
motion. Certainly there was no excuse for the retention of the rule
after Matter of McGarry v. Walsh. The writer, therefore, ventures to
stbmit that Article IV, Section 6 of the Rules of Procedure should
be removed.
Form of the. administrative decision.
By the Charter, the board of appeals was given power "to hear
and decide"gall matters referred to it by the zoning ordinance.4 In
another place; the Charter prescribed that:
"The decision shall be in writing and shall be filed in the
office of the board and promptly published in the bulletin of
the board. Each decision shall so far as is practicable be in
the form of a general statement or resolution which shall be
applicable to cases similar to or falling within the principles
passed upon in such decision." 48
46 The rules still state that there are two ways to get the board to recon-
sider: (1) to reconsider the vote; (2) to move for a rehearing. But the'
succeeding paragraphs define the rehearing and omit mention of the "reconsid-
eration." The word was probably left by mistake, unless it takes care of
postponements where the vote taken is not properly a -final determination
either way. Rules '27, Art. IV, §§ 4-6.
47 See Laws 1917, ch. 601, amending §§ 242-a and 242-b of the Charter to
that effect.
48 Chater § 719-5.
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The nature of the decision is argumentatively indicated by the
Charter when, in providing for the filing and publication of the
resolution, it is stated that "every order, requirement, decision or
determination of the * * * board of appeals shall immediately be
filed in the office of the board and shall be public record. 49 For any
other details we must look to the board's Rules of Procedure.
Every decision of the board is in the form of a resolution
which, in its preliminary clauses, recites the findings of fact. It will
later be seen how important the content of such recitals are in
relation to the strict rule imposed by the reviewing courts that the
content must clearly indicate the facts upon which the board based
its conclusion. The resolution decides either to grant the application
by "reversing, varying, or modifying the order, requirement, decision
or determination appealed from," or to affirm the order by denying
the application."
The board adopts its decision in this manner. After both sides
have presented their arguments, the chairman or the clerk at the
chairman's direction reads the preliminary clauses which state the
facts. If it is a resolution to grant, it is apt to be long, and the
chairman then and there reads off the conditions upon which the
variation is granted. The roll is then called. Specific provisions
in the Charter, as well as in the Rules of Procedure, call for each
member to record his vote. If present, a member has but one
excuse for not voting, viz., a member may not -vote if he or any
corporation in which he is a stockholder or security holder is
interested in the case.
Provisions for Judicial Review.5 1
Taking the case to court.
Those who are aggrieved by any decision of the board of
appeals may, jointly or severally, present to the supreme court, a
verified petition, setting forth the illegality of the decision and the
41 Charter § 718-4.
• SoN. Y. Cent. Co. v. Leo, supra, note 27, criticized the former practice of
the board to grant or deny the appeal when it was authorized to reverse,
modify, or vary the order, etc., appealed from. Cf. Art. IV, § 2 in Rules '18
and '27. See also Charter § 718-d, as amended by Local Law No. 13 (1925).
r, The relevant provisions are §§ 719 (a), 1 to 6, of the Greater New York
Charter.
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grounds thereof. The petition must be presented not more tnan
thirty days after the board filed its decision or published it in the
Bulletin.
Allowance of a certiorari order.5 2
After the presentation of this petition, the court may allow
a certiorari order directing the board to serve a return thereupon
on the relator's attorney within a prescribed time which must not be
less than ten days from the date of allowance. The order is return-
able to the supreme court of the judicial district in which the
property affected is situated.
Effect of the allowance.
The allowance will not stay proceedings upon the board's
decision unless the court on application and after notice to the
board decides there is cause for granting a restraining order.
'The nature of the "return" required.
The board need not send its original records, but it must present
a full transcript of the proceedings before it. And "the return must
concisely set forth such other facts as may be pertinent and material
to show the grounds of the decision appealed from. * * *"
Scope of judicial review.
The court may reverse, affirm or modify, wholly or in part, any
decision of the board which is brought before it for review.
The court's power to take testimony.
"If, upon the hearing, it shall appear to the court that
testimony is necessary for the proper disposition of the
matter, it may take evidence or appoint a referee to take
such evidence as it may direct and report the same to the
court with his findings of fact and conclusions of law, which
shall constitute a part of the proceedings upon which the
determination of the court shall be made." 54
This provision has been restricted in meaning to authorize the court
to take evidence or order a reference only for the purpose of dis-
52 The writ of certiorari was abolished, and wherever that is mentioned in
the statute, the certiorari order is to be substituted. Civil Practice Act (1925)
§§ 1283 et seq.
53 Charter § 719 (a), 3.
5 Ibid. 4.
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covering whether this was or was not a proper case upon which the
board could act, i.e., there is no finality as to the board's determina-
tion that it has jurisdiction to act." .
Costs.
Unless there was gross abuse of discretion or bad faith, costs
will not be assessed against the board.
Preferences.
"All issues in any proceeding under this section shall have
preference over all other civil actions and proceedings."
V.
PERFORMANCE OF THE BOARD:
ITS TECHNIQUE AND ACCOMPLISHMENT.
Administrative Methods.
Introductory.
When the board of appeals was in operation less than three
years, Edward M. Bassett, in reply to a question concerning its work,
said: I
"This board has a regular calendar. It passes on its
cases after deliberation like a regular court. Millions of
dollars of property go under its consideration and its work
goes on smoothly."
It is hoped that the content of this chapter will enable the reader
to judge for himself. We have examined the procedure, the manner
in which the administrative machinery is set in motion, the steps to
be taken to procure an administrative "trial" and decision, and the
method by which such determination may be brought before a
reviewing court. The more difficult task of looking into the temper
of the board, its attitude to the problems that come before it and
the technique which it has developed for their disposition, is now
before us. It has been recognized that the temptation to right an
apparent wrong may lead the board to overstep its proper authority.2
-2 Infra Chapter VI.
.- Supra, note 53, at 6.
' Citizens' Zone Plan Conference, Chicago, Dec., 1919. See Report of its
Proceedings (pamphlet). Address of Edward M. Bassett.
2 "The Board of Appeals in Zoning." p. 16.
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In People ex rel. Brannon v. Walsh," the court annulled the board's
determination and made this comment:
"There is a natural desire for boards of similar juris-
diction to magnify their power and extend it no doubt in
good faith in many instances; but, unless ctrbed, the mag-
nifying of their powers would lead to a total disregard for
the statute."
On the oiher hand, the board has been recognized as a necessary
instrument of constitutional zoning, for, where it acts within its
powers,4
"* * * the inequalities and injustices resulting from a strict
enforcement of a general, zoning ordinance will in most
instances be avoided; the board in this respect acts with some-
thing of the ancient powers of a court of equity in a field
where the law by reason of its generality works an injustice."
It is the behavior of this modem instrument in its role of dispensing
equitable relief in particular cases that now engages our attention.
Conduct of the "administrative rial."
Proceedings at the public hearing though governed by the rules
as previously described, are nevertheless very informal. Since there
is no privilege of cross examination, each side is subjected to inter-
rogation by the chairman. Apparently there are not rules as to
the scope of questions or answers. Anything that is relevant will
be heard. But inasmuch as the board may itself have knowledge
of the case through the written report of its inspection committee,
or from its previous experience in the locality involved, either side
may be interrupted by the chairman and be told that further elabora-
tion of an argument was unnecessary or perhaps futile because "we
know all that" In other instances, the chairman will turn to the
chief of the Fire Department, a member of the board, to consult
him about what was just said in argument concerning a building
or street referred to. Not infrequently a petitioner will be inter-
rupted to be told of a similar case that the chairman recalls. Of
course, the board is not bound by its own decision. Its 'aison d'etre
i. the need of a particularized judgment in each case. And so the
similar case seems to be introduced only by way of argument, that
s 195 N. Y. Supp. 264, 267.
4 In the Matter of St. Basil's Church v. Kerner, 125 Misc. 526, 534, 211
N. Y. Supp. 470. And see supra III, note 3.
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is to say, the petitioner may nevertheless win 'by producing special
facts, or additional evidence of "unnecessary hardships." And
failure to meet the challenge to produce stronger evidence will prob-
ably lead the board to follow its previous decision. And so while
the doctrine of stare decisis does not prevail here, reasons psycho-
logical and practical in nature may influence the board to found its
determination of the instant case upon one previously decided under
'imilar circumstances. In any event, the board's practice is not to
cite the precedent in its final resolution. The reason is perhaps that
each case must be sustained by its own strength, for in the event of
judicial review, the court will not be content with a precedent. but
will insist upon a full statement of the grounds for this decision.-
The informality of the chairman's conduct has been commented
upon in two cases. The decision of the board was disallowed by
Judge Dowling speaking for the majority in Application of Golden-
berg v. Walsh, and it was there said:
"The so-called 'hearing' before the board consists prin-
cipally of colloquy between the chairman and an objecting
property owner. * * * Much of the dialogue between the
chairman and this objector was devoted to a discussion of
general garage conditions in the Bronx, having nothing what-
ever to do with the merits of the application then pending." 8
And in an earlier case, the Special Term said:
"The hearing had before the board was the usual cursory
proceeding commonly had there with little regard for the real
essentials or merits involved in the controversy." -
In the first case the opinion that gave rise to the general indictment
of the board's method of action was reversed by the Court of
Appeals; in the second, the universality of the statement was hardly
necessary to the decision because the board was clearly in error when
it premised its denial of a permit to avoid "the desecration of the
community." Whether deserved or not, both strong utterances
reveal how this informality is apt to irritate a reviewing judge who
5 See infru.
0 215 App. Div. 396. 399. Reversed and the board's decision reinstated on
the basis of the dissenting opinion below in 242 N. Y. 82, 152 N. E. 434 (1926).
7 People ex rel. Parry '. Walsh. 121 Misc. 31. 202 N. Y. Supp. 48, aff'd.
20') App. Div. 889.
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sees it properly and cettainly in good faith. A similar innuendo may
be discerned in the language of Judge Cardozo:
"Upon a record made up for the most part of informal
colloquy with counsel, the board granted the petition, one
member dissenting." '
This matter is wholly within the control of the chairman and
it would be wise for him to do his utmost in reducing to a minimum
the "colloquy" and "general discussion." Of course, much of this
talk gets into the record because of the board's conciliatory policy
and desire to have the parties before it see just why discretion
dictates one decision rather than the other and why the added
conditions are necessary.
That the board does realize the seriousness of its task despite
the air of informality, may be illustrated by a passage in the trans-
cript of its proceedings in connection with the application for a
variance in the use of the Astor property on Madison Avenue. The
question was whether the vote should be taken that day or a sub-
committee appointed for further investigation.
Chief Kenlon: "Learned counsel on both sides have
been over every point in the arguments here. But the prin-
cipal point to my mind is that we should eliminate the fact
that it concerns Mr. Astor, or Lord Astor as Mr. Baylies
puts it. * * * We consider only whether this is a proper
extension and what our powers are in regard to it; whether
such an extension would improve conditions there or depre-
ciate the value of the property in the neighborhood."
Mr. Baylies, representing the objecting residence owners, then sug-
gested that printed record and docufnents be considered in sub-
committee or in executive session.
Chief Kenlon: "I take exception to your statement, on
the grounds that all cases are. heard in public. This is an
important board and this is the greatest case we have had
yet. The law requires that we discuss and vote on it in
public. I do not want a committee; we are here and ready
8 People ex rel. Fordham Manor Church v. Wajsh, 244 N. Y. 280, 285
(1927).
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to decide. We are intelligent men,--I think we are anyway;
and I think every man is familiar with the case." a
The reports of inspection committees.
Examination of the premises and locality by the experts who
will participate in deciding the case is an important, primary source
of evidence. The object of the inspection committee of which the
chairman must always be a member, is to find the facts and submit
its recommendations to the board. It is particularly useful to have
an inspection because the board is then in a better position to judge
whether a denial of relief would result in unnecessary hardship, or
whether (if there is such hardship) the proposed non-conforming
use is suitable for the district; and if it is, what conditions need be
exadted to safeguard the neighborhood. Three committee reports
will be used to illustrate the actual operation of the board through
this evidence-finding device.
1. Where unnecessary hardship would not result. This was
an application for a permit to build a forbidden public garage in a
district which was designated "business" on the map but which was
as yet undeveloped. A dominant use had not yet established itself,
but the presence of a playground and a school nearby as well as the
two-family dwellings situated in the sidestreets, led the zoning
authorities to believe that the locality in question could be used for
small neighborhood stores and shops. The reasoning of the com-
mittee recommending a denial of the application was as follows: 10
"(a) The mere existence of a non-conforming use in
the nature of a wet-wash laundry * * * before the creation
of the Zoning Law, is not sufficient to warrant the further
invasion of the district with prohibited uses.
(b) After a description of the surrounding property, the
committee observed that the pupils of the school use both
Herz| Street and Douglas Street not only to reach the play-
ground but to get to their homes.
(c) The extensive development of the side streets with
conforming uses in the nature of dwellings would seem to
indicate the necessity of shops on Livonia Avenue for the
' Transcript of Proceedings of the Board of Appeals on Apr. 30, 1918, in
connection with the case, People ex rel. Sheldon v. Board of Appeals, 234
N. Y. 484, as reprinted in the brief for the Relator-Respondent.
109 Bulletin, No. 6, p. 158 (1924).
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accommodation of the neighborhood, and the reasonable and
practical use of this property for store and business uses
and community requirement.
(d) The committee therefore believes the element of
hardship does not prevail, in that the property may be used
for conforming structures, and recommend denial of the
application."
2. Where there is hardship, but the suitability of the proposed
variation is in question. Twenty-five persons filed objections to the
petitioner's application which was based on Section twenty (now
twenty-one), viz., unnecessary hardship. The inspection committee
reported that the board would be justified in. granting the appeal
with appropriate conditions, "if it can be shown that the petition
on file (in opposition) was engendered by other than substantial,
presumed offense." And the reason for the committee's approval
of the proposed non-conforming use was thus expressed:"I
"From a general observation of the neighborhood it
would appear that there are no public garages for the accom-
modation of these apartment house developments. It cannot
be denied that there is a community requirement for garage
use. The point the board may well bear in mind is where
public garages could best be placed with least offense to the
neighborhood and properties."
3. Where the committee is concerned only with safeguarding
conditions. It was found that the business area as to which the
request for a variance was made "was evidently established by the
Board of Estimate as a buffer district between the residential use
of Ocean Parkway and the unrestricted use of Caton Place." The
report therefore concluded:
"The committee feels that the granting of this applica-
tion, with proper restriction as to height, entrances, etc.,
would be an equitable adjustment permitting the reasonable
use of this property." 12
1 Ibid. at 157.
'2 Ibid. at 158. And Cf. 10 Bulletin, No. 3 (1925), case number 1128-23-BZ,
where a committee was appointed for the express purpose of reporting on the
advisability of imposing the condition that no vehicular use or opening shall
be maintained on a certain street by the applicant if he is allowed to operate
a garage there.
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Because of the task of inspection in determing whether a denial
or equitable adjustment would entail unnecessary hardship or
whether a building devoted to a conforming use would yield an
income proportionate to the value of the land, or if in any event the
harm to the whole district far exceeds the hardship resulting, is
admittedly a delicate one, the viewing committee may be tempted to
the broader domain of generalization on "community interest."
When it does so and the resolution of the board incorporates that
report as its main ground for action, the determination will not be
allowed to stand. 8 And it is not the concern of an inspecting
committee to recommend a denial because the applicant was so bold
as to begin the proposed extension in violation of the law. Accord-
ingly the board's decision which was based on such report, was
deemed illegal. The report in People ex rel. Kannensohn Holding
Corj. v. Walsh concluded in this manner:' 14
"The expression of the committee as to the disapproval
of this appeal was for the reason that the building was and
is being erected on the presumption of a disregard for the
Building Zone Resolution and the committee therefore recom-
mends the denial of this appeal."
Despite the analogy of orthodox equity powers being vested in the
board, it must act within its statutory authority and not invoke the
familiar equity rule of "clean hands." '
13 People ex rel. Smith v. Walsh, 211 App. Div. 205, 208, 207 N. Y. Supp.
324, aff'd, 240 N. Y. 606, 148 N. E. 724 (1925). The ground of the board's
action was that "There seemed substantial cpmmunity requirement for auto-
mobile storage and accommodation and that the community interest would
best be served and the integrity of the Zoning Resolution maintained by per-
miting," etc. The board's action was fortunately saved because, though the
stated reason was erroneous, there existed in fact unnecessary hardship. The
court went into the matter and found that was the fact. On appeal the Court
of Appeals affirmed the case on the merits, but stated that a sounder pro-
cedure requires the case to be sent back to the board. Since no substantial
damage was done, the opinion was allowed to stand.
14 120 Misc. 469, 471, 472, 199 N. Y. Supp. 534.
'" Good faith or the lack of it is material only to determine the question
of unnecessary hardship, thus: An applicant established that he had bought
some property with the intent to construct a building, the ground floor to be
devoted to stores. After the purchase and while plans were being prepared,
the board of estimate, in amending the map, put this plot into a residence
district. The board held that there was unnecessary hardship in the strict
enforcement of the law, emphasizing the fact that the petitioner bought the
property in good faith. 9 Bulletin, No. 5, p. 125, Case No. 1194-23-BZ. And
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The sature of the protective conditions.
Unquestionably the outstanding feature of the board's technique
is the power to grant applications conditionally. That the board
possesses this power is important, but the manner of its exercise
is more so. As early as 1699, there is an entry in the Minutes of
the Common Council of New York City containing the report of
"the Committee appointed to view the place whereon Jasper Nessepot
intends to build a mill at Kings Bridge." It was recommended that
the petition be granted-
"on condition that he take out of the way the stones and
rocks on the other side thereof, that the same may not hinder
the passage of boats and canoes and when any is to pass, at
their reasonable request, he is to shut his sluices and on the
other side of the bridge erect a post in the water and have
a rope ready to assist them in passing."' 6
These conditions were given in full to indicate the element of
bargaining, the element of exacting a price for the permission to
build the mill. Anyone present at the hearings of the board of
appeals will soon be persuaded that here, too, there is bargaining.
Perhaps it is fairer to say there is compromise, the process of give
and take, so necessary in the adjustment of competing interests. If
the petitioner is to be allowed to extend his building devoted to a
business use, into a residence district, it is fair to have him agree
not to maintain delivery entrances with the attendant noise and dirt
on that side of his building which fronts on the residential street.
It is perhaps another matter to impose upon him requirements that
are frankly aesthetic in natute. 7 And if it is not improper for the
board to impose conditions of that character under the formula of
"to preserve the amenities of the neighborhood," what is the 'limit
of its authority to do so? The court has not yet had occasion to
compare the case where an applicant knowing the district to be zoned "resi-
dential," purchased a corner lot with the intent to build a garage there and
upon the assumption that it was a proper case for a variance. He was mis-
taken and the board's denial that there was "unnecessary hardship" was
sustained. People ex rel. Apollo Bldg. Corp. v. Walsh. N. Y. L. J., Aug. 9,
1926 A similar case is People ex rel Hamal Co, v. Walsh, N. Y. L. J., Aug.
7, 1925, at p. 1602.
-61 Minutes of the Common Council of the City of New York (1675-
1776), 98.
17 See "The Law of Zoning and City Planning." by Williams, pp. 566 ef
seq., especially 572-n.
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deal with a case where the jurisdiction of the board to act is
undisputed but objection is made to the nature of the safeguarding
conditions imposed.
What legal sanction is there for the power to fix conditions?
Nothing specific .is found in the enabling provisions on the point.
The answer may be contained inferentially in the broad language of
those provisions granting the board power to vary the application
of the law "so that the spirit of the law shall be observed, public
safety secured and substantial justice be done.""' Section seven of
the zoning ordinance which, it will be recalled, enumerates the
exceptional cases wherein the board may determine and vary the
use district regulations, mentions conditions twice. Its introductory
paragraph states that relief may be given in appropriate cases "sub-
ject to appropriate conditions and safeguards." Section seven (c)
allowing the board to authorize the extension of an existing build-
ing into a more restricted district also gives it power to impose "such
conditions as will safeguard the character of the more restricted
district." Strangely enough Section twenty (now twenty-one),
conferring the general power to vary where hardship exists, contains
nothing about conditions. The board itself has never deemed it
helpful to express its policy as the imposition of protective condi-
tions. There are no rules as to the manner of wording them. One
attending a public hearing of the board would be sure to note that
at the end of the argument, the chairman announces that there is a
resolution to grant on. condition that-and then the conditions are
by him enumerated. The roll is then called. Neither the Rules of
Procedure nor any of the board's general resolutions concern them-
selves with this important source of power. The only time it is
mentioned is when the administrative officer is directed to inform
the board when the conditions are not observed. The board did
announce its policy as to "time conditions," i.e., the time within
which the necessary permits for the building contemplated by the
resolution were to be procured and how long thereafter the work
was to be completed."' Of the other conditions, those which in
their operation give the board greatest opportunity affirmatively to
control the structure, use and appearance of the non-conforming
1L Charter § 719-5.
19 Resolution adopted June 26, 1917. See 3 Bulletin, No. 21, p. 620 (1918).
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buildings that it allows, nothing is said. The exact nature and scope
of these conditions will now engage our attention.
Except for some typical conditions that the board uniformly
imposes when dealing with the construction and design of garage
roofs and skylights, the control in number and style of vehicular
openings, the description of front walls and walls that shall remain
unpierced, each set of conditions is unique. We can get some idea
of their nature by examination of some samples.
1. An early case, October 3, 1916.20 Resolved that the appeal
be and it is hereby granted on condition that the Fulton Street front
of the building be so designed as to eliminate any entrances for
vehicles and to give that street front the appearance of a businesJ
building rather than that of a garage.
2. A petitioner who under law could not build higher than 127
feet, requested a permit for 143 feet straight wall height. It was
resolved 2 ' "that the application be and is granted on condition that
the height of the street wall shall not exceed 133 feet." In substance
the board changed the request. It is mere pretense to grant a 143
feet application on condition that the building shall not be carried
higher than 133 feet. But it is not objectionable for the board
to impose this condition because it makes it unnecessary for the
applicant to make a new application for authorization to build up
to the lesser height allowed by the board. But now we come to
more complex resolutions.
3. On the ground of unnecessary hardship, the applicant was
allowed in a residence district to erect a corner building to be used
for stores. The following conditions were imposed:
(a) They must be retail stores or shops: (b) a deli-
catessen store or a fish store is specifically forbidden: (c) the
remainder of the premises must be used for dwellings: (d)
commercial openings, windows or doors were not to be located
on Dahill Road: (i) the exterior face of the building on the
entire street fronts other than the store show windows were
to be finished with "light colored face brick with architectural
terra cotta or stone trimmings": (f) the westerly gable wall
20 Calendar, No. 160. From a collection of 180 early cases decided by the
board that were reprinted in "Building Zones," by G. B. Ford.
21 10 Bulletin, No. 3, Case No. 1198-24-BZ, p. 63.
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for a distance of 12 feet from Dahill Road, shall also be faced
with front brick: (g) there were to be no signs or advertis-
ing of any nature or description permitted on the Dahill Road"
front, and any advertising on the Ditmas Avenue front was
restricted to the plate glass show windows of the stores:
(h) the usual time conditions. 22
Of course this is a far throw from the simple conditions that the
board imposed in the early cases. If so many Conditions are neces-
sary, one wonders why it was a proper case for a variation at all.
Nevertheless such' elaborate conditions are not at all exceptional.
They are frequent."2  And along with this development came the
board's anxiety lest it be easy to evade the conditions. In a resolu-
tion granting an application for a garage fronting on Fifth Avenue
to which were 'attached conditions even more detailed than in the
example just given, we, therefore, find a final condition, "that on
completion of the structure the architect-appellant shall certify that
the conditions as above laid down have been observed in spirit as
well as in letter." 24 How that may be enforced is difficult to per-
ceive. A similar condition imljosed in another case is better calcu-
lated to produce the desired result, namely.
"on condition that * * * a return of the proposed finished
design of the Thayer Street elevation shall be made to his
board for its approval before submitting same to the super-
intendent of buildings." 2-
Of course the regular means of enforcing observance is in the
hands of the official who grants the final building permit. And it
is provided in the Rules of Procedure that-
"Any administrative official discovering any misstate-
ments of essential information is requested to notify the
Board, in order that it may take such action as the circum-
stances require. All approvals shall remain valid only as
22 11 Bulletin, No. 5, Case No. 605-25-BZ, p. 131.
-2 That such conditions are not unusual is evidenced by the fact that M_ K
Bassett cited this particular resolution as an example of the board's work.
See "City Planning," April, 1926. p. 127.
24 10 Bulletin, No. 4, Case No. 636-20-BZ, p. 94.
22 Ibid. No. 7, Case No. 1125-24-BZ, p. 190. An inspection may be neces-
sary to -determine the necessary conditions. See Ibid. No. 3, Case No. 1128-
23-BZ.
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long as the information and conditions on which the resolution
was based are maintained." 20
It seems clear that the exaction of conditions is an important
instrument in the hands of the board for the accomplishment of its
task to adjust exceptional and difficult cases in harmony with the
purposes to be achieved by the restriction of the other property in
the district. The use of this device does make for a controlled
mobility.27 On the whole, it is not difficult to agree with the opinion
expressed by the most prominent exponent of zoning in the country,
that-
"These conditional requirements accompanying variances
produce remarkable results-results that could not possibly
be attained by the comparatively broad regulations of the
ordinance itself.
28
But some criticism does suggest itself. Conscious of its power
to impose numerous specific protective conditions, the board can
more readily be persuaded to grant variances on the theory that
the conditions are a sufficient protection. Of course, that would be
an improper use of this device. The board must be clear that it
has jurisdiction before it can properly act at all. If the established
ficts bring the case within the board's power, it may consider the
wisest manner in which its jurisdiction ought to be exercised.
Exaction of safeguarding conditions is not the price for any favor
conferred upon the applicant. By hypothesis he has made out a case
under Section seven or twenty-one. If he failed, he may be willing
to take the granting resolution under any conditions. But that ought
not influence the board to act beyond its authority. And just as the
board may abuse its power in taking jurisdiction, it may be guilty
of a like abuse in the exercise thereof. It is very difficult to draw
the line, but it seems that where instead of saying that conditions
achieve results that could not "possibly be attained" otherwise, it
could fairly be said to be reaching results that "could not constitu-
tionally be attained" otherwise; i.e., a statutory provision for aesthetic
purposes-the resolution ought not be allowed to stand. Cases call-
26 Rules '27, Art. II, § 1, 12 Bulletin. No. 8, p. 262.
-7 Milwaukee is perhaps the only city in which the zoning board of appeals
grants or refuses to grant. Conditions are not imposed.
28 1 City Planning. 129, "Zoning Roundtable," conducted by Edward M.
Bassett.
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ifg for judicial control of the scope of the board's power to impose
conditions have not come up. When the board's action was annulled,
there were other reasons; when its decision was upheld, the court
spoke approvingly of the conditions. In People ex rel. Beinert z.
Miller, Judge Benedict, speaking for the Supreme Court, objected
to the board's resolution which by operation of its conditions, effected
so material a reduction in size and plan of the proposed building
as to merit the charge that the board re-made the plans. And
therefore, it was argued that this was not really a final determination
as required by the Charter because-
"Its decision was in effect to promise, in advance of any
application by the owner of the property for approval of
new plans * * * that the board would approve such new
plans upon appeal, whatever might be the attitude of the
superintendent in respect thereof." 29
This decision was reversed in the Appellate Division on the ground
that the board did have jurisdiction to act and that abuse was not
established.3 0 It is submitted, however, that while the fact that the
variance was granted may not be an abuse of discretion, -the nature
and extent of the "safeguarding conditions" imposed may render
the decision arbitrary and upsettable. The question is not likely to
arise save in an extreme case, because (1) though compliance with
excessive conditions increases the cost, the applicant stands to lose
more if he gets no variance."' When alternative evils beset him, his
eagerness to escape. the greater leaves him prepared to accept the
lesser. (2) The second reason is that the board is aided by a pre-
sumption of correctness once its jurisdiction is established, and the
court will hesitate in the usual case to send the case back because the
conditions are excessive.
The field of peremptory action.
When .an applicant makes fraudulent representations to the
board, the board has power to revoke his permit. Revocation by
the board of a certificate of occupancy because the petitioner repre-
29 120 Misc. 318, 325, 165 N. Y. Supp. 602 (1917).
30 188 App. Div. 113, 176 N. Y. Supp. 398 (1919).
31 All owners of property affected by the zoning law suffer "hardship".
But a general hardship is not "unnecessary hardship" and the applicant will
not wish to take his chance in court where he must overcome the presumption
of correctness.
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sented his land to he 60 feet wide when it was but 40 feet wide was
su-tained by the court in The Matter of Fontana.12  On the other
hand where the owner in good faith relied upon a permit erroneously
granted him by an officer in the bureau of buildings, the board by
resolution decided to let him continue the forbidden use for two
yea rs :
* * * as it appears that the owner at least informed
the administrative authority presumed to have knowledge of
the law, the board feels an equitable adjustment supports at
least a temporary use." 3
As to matters preliminary to the -public hearing, the board
announced that any action "tying the hands of the administrative
official in the performance of his duty" will invite summary dismissal
of the application. Though the application was properly filed, fail-
ure within a reasonable time to complete the papers requested by the
board will lead to dismissal of the case." The same consequences
may attend failure on the part of the appellant to appear at the
public hearing after being notified. 35
;,eneral resolutions.
General resolutions are confined, practically to a statement of
the hoard's interpretation of the statute as applied to a certain class
of property use. It was decided, for example, that offices of doctors
and dentists come within the meaning of "sanitarium" and so are
not excluded from residential districts. And it was also decided
that a Turkish and Russian bath establishment may properly be
operated in a "business district." Of a more general nature is
the resolution interpreting Section three of the zoning ordinance
as follows:
"It is the sense of this board that bill boards are within
tle purview of the objectionable and prohibited features
under the building zone resolution in a residence district." 31
N. Y. L. J.. May 19, 1925, at p. 700.
. 10 Bulletin, No. 6. Case No. 14-24-BZ, p. 155 (1925). But see supra,
n,,te 15.
4 12 Ibid. No.. 8, p. 190.
: 3 Ibid. No. 21, p. 608.
• 6 See collection in "Building Zones," supra, note 20, Nos. 262-16, 232-16-A,
1548-19-A.
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A public hearing advertised in the usual manner must be had before
such interpreting resolution is adopted. Another class of resolutions
that are general, are those adopted pursuant to the Charter pro-
vision -3 that the board make annual suggestions to the mayor con-
cerning amendments to the zoning ordinance.
Administrative Statistics.
The board is required to submit a report to the mayor at the
close of each year. Unfortunately those reports as printed in the
board's official Bulletin are of little value for our purpose. In the
first place about half of the reports made no attempt to differentiate
the cases decided by the board of appeals from those decided by the
board of standards and appeals. When that was remedied, just one
rough classification of .cases appeared: those that are appeals from
administrative orders and those that are applications under the
Building Zone Resolution. We should like to know more; the
proportion of applications granted with conditions to those granted
outright; the number of variations in use districts as compared with
variances in height and area zones; and the relative number of
variances in each of the five boroughs. The reports of the Chicago
and Pittsburgh boards of appeals are certainly more informative.3 8
Presumably this information would be useful in the work of re-
making the zone maps from time to time.39
Some idea of the volume of business that came before both
boards may be had from figures covering the years 1916-1925. Of
14,401 cases filed, 2,057 were withdrawn, 2,034 dismissed, and
2,507 denied, and 7,678 were granted. It seems that from the very
beginning garage cases outnumbered by far all others coming before
the board of appeals. From October 5, 1916, when the board first
began to function until January 16, 1917, there were 206 cases, of
which 35 were left pending and 169 were decided. The following
table is based on figures for that period given in an unofficial
publication, "Building Zones":
3, Charter § 718a-5. And see Rules '27, Art. IX, 1§ 1 and 2, "Other Reso-
lutions."38 It seems curious that the New York board, though invited, did not join
in the Symposium on Boards of Appeals in Zoning. See City Planning for
Jan., 1927, "Zoning Roundtable."
39 The writer was told at the office of the Zoing Committee that such tabu-
lations were not available.
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Total per
Granted Denied Withdrawn Dismissed Borough
Brooklyn .............. 51 29 4 8 92
Manhattan ............ 34 4 9 4 51
Bronx ................. 7 2 3 3 15
Queens ............... 4 1 2 2 9
Richmond ............. 2 0 0 0 2
Total in City .......... 98 36 18 17 169
In the whole city 80% of all the cases were for garages for more
than five motor cars in a business street where there was an existing
garage or stable. 82% of the 98 appeals granted were garage
cases; 80% of the 36 appeals denied; 80% of the 17 appeals dis-
missed; and 76% of the 18 appeals withdrawn. It would be inter-
esting to know if the same proportion of garage cases exists today.
For reasons already explained the second table, showing the
number of appeals and applications that were taken to the board
of appeals, is incomplete. The figures were taken from the annual
reports.
'16 '17 '18 '19 '20 "21 '22 '23 '24 '25
Appeals from adminis-
trative orders .... 544 613 631 593 744 514
Applications under Build-
ing Zone Resolution 247 331 341 477 510 432
Total ............... 791 944 1022 1070 1254 946
The number of meetings and inspections annually since 1921
are as follows: 40
Meetings Inspections
1921 .......................... 66 50
1922 .......................... 56 31
1923 .......................... 58 36
1924 .......................... 93 28
1925 .......................... 95 40
VI.
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ACTION TAKEN BY THE
BOARD OF APPEALS IN ZONING APPLICATIONS.
Introductory.
Where property restrictions imposed by a zoning law are not
considered a proper exercise of the police power, the board I of
40 Figures were taken fom the board's annual report, published at the
beginning of each year in the Buleltin.
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appeals cannot be an effective, constitutional "safety valve."1  It
seems proper, therefore, to ascertain what is the judicial attitude
towards the zoning law as a whole. And so we shall briefly examine
the significant decisions, not involving the board of appeals, which
deal with the effect of the Building Zone Resolution upon private
property generally.
It is nowhere denied, in the New York decisions that the
Building Zone Resolution, adopted pursuant to an authority expressly
delegated by the legislature to the city, has the force of a statute.
Matter of Stubbe v. Adamson,2 frequently cited on that point, ac-
cords such ordinance the presumption of constitutionality, for-
"* * * however the courts may doubt the wisdom of an
enactment they cannot pronounce the same unconstitutional
unless able to see either that there is no real substantial evil of
public interest to be guarded against or that there is no
reasonable relation between the evil and the purported cure
or prevention offered by the statute." 3
In the first line of cases to be considered, the constitutionality
of zoning was present as a collateral issue. Anderson v. Steinway 4
was a case where the seller, seeking specific performance of a
contract to purchase land, was met by the defense that because the
Building Zone Resolution was passed after the contract was made
but before the time of performance, the buyer need not go on in
view of the restriction imposed on the property in question. The
Special Term held that the zoning ordinance was not an encum-
brance and that the buyer had no defense. Upon appeal this was
reversed on the ground that if the ordinance was valid, the buyer
could not lawfully use the land as contemplated by the contracting
parties; if it i's invalid, he is burdened with a lawsuit. Some time
thereafter, a purchaser under a contract made after the passage of
the ordinance, was denied a defense in a suit for specific perform-
ance unless special damage was shown. The Court of Appeals.
in Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Building Corporation," held that
' This has been previously indicated by a citation of New Jersey cases.
See supra, II, n. 9.
2220 N. Y. 459. 465, 116 N. E. 372 (1917).
3 Ibid. at 469.
4 165 N. Y. Supp. 608, 178 App. Div. 507, 221 N. Y. 639 (1916).
• 169 N. Y. Supp. 1045. 229 N. Y. 313. 317, reversing the Appellate Division.
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the zoning resolution "was not an incumbrance, since it was a proper
exercise of the police power." Since the contract was made after
the ordinance was passed, Anderson v. Steinway did not apply;
there was not special damage. And the Court of Appeals further
limited the meaning of special damage in Biggs v. Steinway Sons.6
That the zoning law is not an -encumbrance on property sold at a
judicial sale was decided by Creighton v. BurnsT And when at a
judicial sale the purchaser refused to take title on the ground that
the zoning law was being violated on the premises, it was held that
the violation of that law does not constitute a defect in title., But
the fact that the zoning restrictions were coextensive with the private
restrictions which the purchaser later discovered, does not obligate
him to accept title. It was held that Lincoln Trust Co. v. Building
Corporation did not apply because the repeal or amendment of the
ordinance would still leave the land encumbered.
In another line of decisions which directly involve the effect of
the zoning ordinance on private right, it was held that the general
hardship produced by the zoning restrictions afforded no ground
of complaint.'" The theory that the zone plan was a community
plan seemed clearly to be applied in Whitridge v. Park." That was
an early zoning case where neighborhood property owners were
denied an injunction on the ground that a violation of the zoning
law, if not a nuisance per se, does not injure the owners of adjoin-
ing property any more than the rest of .,the public. Nor did the
Court of Appeals shrink from this view of zoning as a comprehen-
61D contracted to buy lots X and Y from independent owners who knew
he wished to erect a large building on both. The zoning ordinance affected
Y but not X. It was held that the owner of X is entitled to specific per-
formance because he could offer a good title; his knowledge that D was also
relying on Y did not matter. The opposite conclusion arrived at by applying
Anderson ?,. Steinway was reversed in the Court of Appeals. 229 N. Y. 320
(1920), rev'ing, 191 App. Div. 526.
7N. Y. L J., Oct. 29, 1925, at p. 137.
B Davis v. Philbert, N. I. L. J., April 16, 1925, at p. 222.
9Kimball Co. v. Fox. 239 N. Y. 554, aff'ig., 209 App. Div. 812. which
affirmed 120 Misc. 701, 200 N. Y. 'Supp. 267.
tO People ex reL Rosevale Realty Co., Inc., v. Kleinert, 237 N. Y. 580, 143
N. E. 750 (1924), writ of error dismissed, 45 Sup. Ct. 618 (1925), because
the constitutionality of the zoning law as a whole was not properly raised.
11 N. Y. L. J., Feb. 19, 1917, at p. 1808. But an injunction will be granted
where the neighborhood owners show secial damage. Cohen v. Rosevale
Realty Corp., 121 Misc. 618, aff'd, 206 App. Div. 681 (1923).
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sive, community plan when the Matter of Wulfsohn v. *Burdenr2
called for its application to an ordinance that prescribed fifty feet
set backs and a height not exceeding five stories in residential dis-
trict "A." Though aimed to prevent apartment houses in such a
residential zone, the Act was held a valid exercise of the police
power. Judge Hiscock said:
-The power is not limited to regulations designated to
promote the public health * * * or to. the suppression of
what is offensive * * * but it extends to so dealing with
conditions which exist as to bring out of them the greatest
welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or
general prosperity * * * (Therefore) zoning authorities
should have the right in a residential district to promote these
purposes * * * by excluding big apartment houses * * *
whereby the enjoyment of light and air by adjoining property
would be impaired, the congestion and dangers of traffic be
augmented on streets where children might be and the dan-
gers of disease and fires would be increased to say nothing
of other things such as destruction of the character of the
district as a residential one and the impairment in value of
property already devoted to private residences." "
If to these cases which indorse zoning as a community plan. will
be added the cases previously cited, 4 which considered the board of
appeals to be a constitutional device to make necessary adjustments,
we shall be prepared to examine the decisions which deal merely
with the operation of the board in deciding the specific case before it.
The ,wture of a zvarin ce.
People ex rel. Sheldon v. Board of Appeals,"' which was the
most important case decided by the board and the first important
determination of the board that was brought up -to the Court of Ap-
peals, involved the question whether the west side of Madison
kvenue, between 35th and 36th Streets which was zoned residential
could be used for business purposes. A chronological statement of
12241 N. Y. 288 (1925).
13Ibid. at 298, 301.
l4 Supra II, n. 3.
15 234 N. Y. 484 (1923) rev'ing, 200 App. Div. 907 (1922), which had
affirmed 115 Misc. 449 (1921).
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the steps taken in the case seems necessary for a proper understand-
ing of the board's action and the opinions of the courts.
The zoning commission had great difficulty in deciding upon
the proper districting of Madison Avenue between 35th and 40th
Streets. In the tentative report, that part of the city was zoned
residential; on June 2, 1916, the date of the final report, a hearing
on the matter resulted in a change of those streets to a business
district. At a subsequent hearing, the mayor suggested a recon-
sideration. That was held on June 21, 1916, and resulted in a con-
firmation of the commission's decision to designate that district,
including the property owned by Mr. William Astor, "all business."
But when that report went through the committee of the whole, it
emerged as the "checker-board plan" for the westerly side of Madi-
son Avenue. The street was designated as residential from 35th to
36th, as business from 37th to 38th, as residential from 38th to
39th, and as business from 39th to 40th. By this compromise plan,
the Astor property (35th to 36th) was left restricted to residential
uses. An amendment was sought from the board of estimate and
apportionment. The application was sent to the committee on the
City Plan. It was there recommended that an appeal be taken to the
board of appeals. During the pendency of the second petition for
an amendment, such appeal for a variance was taken. In the spring
of 1918, after a reorganization of the board caused by the replace-
ment of four of the six appointees of the mayor, the appeal was
heard and a variation granted on April 30, 1918. On May 3, 1918,
the board of estimate and apportionment heard the getition to change
the Astor block into a business district. The Flintlock Realty Com-
pany, of which Mr. Morgan was president, and the owners or resi-
dences in the neighborhood, among them Mr. William D. Guthrie,
appeared in opposition. Having won a denial to amend, those op-
posed to the Astor interests sought to upset the board of appeals'
grant of a variation and brought certiorari proceedings.
What were the issues before the board? Madison Avenue was
in a transition stage at that point. It had been a celebrated residen-
tial district. But business uses soon came to predominate; the
street became a main business thoroughfare between 34th and 42nd
Street)8 The' Astor plot extended 245 feet on 35th Street, 200
16 The eastern side of Madison Avenue was protected by private covenants.
See Schoonmaker v. Heckscher. 218 N. Y. 722 (1916).
ZONVING ADMINISTRATION
feet on Madison Avenue, and 220 feet on 36th Street. Both side
streets were in business districts and Mr. Astor wanted to erect a
building to be used for a dry goods establishment having a frontage
on Madison Avenue which was in a residence area. Section seven
(c) allowed the board in appropriate cases and subject to proper
conditions to "permit the extension of an existing or proposed build-
ing into a more restricted district." The board found that strict
enforcement of the law would result in unnecessary hardship and
that conditions safeguarding the more restricted district "can" be
imposed. The board, therefore, adopted a resolution granting the
application. The elaborate conditions are given in the footnote."
Upon review by the Supreme Court the order granting the permit
was annulled.' This was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate
Division. 9 Upon what theory may the court's opinion be sup-
ported?
It will be remembered that the theoretical premise is that the
board of appeals does not under any circumstances have, nor could
it have been given, the power to amend the provisions of the zoning
ordinance. It does have the power in certain exceptional cases to
modify the application of the law. What is the distinction between
an amendment in the law and its modification or variation by the
board? Apparently Mr. Astor was not particular. Either one would
enable him to build the way he wished. In a later case, Chief
Judge Cardozo, dealing with this distinction, said:
"No one can doubt that Aqueduct Avenue at this point
will be taken out of the residence district as effectively as if
the old map had been withdrawn and another with a new
17 "Resolved, that the appeal be and it hereby is granted on condition
that the building shall conform in appearance, except as to the parapet wall,
with the water-color perspective submitted by the appellant; that the build-
ing shall not exceed seven stories, nor 112 feet in total height; that the three
facades shall be faced, uniformly, with either limestone or marble; that
there shall be but one entrance to the building on the Madison Avenue front;
that the balcony shown over the second story shall be constructed of material
uniform with the rest of the facade; that the parapet wall above the main
cornice of the building shall be designed to harmonize with the architecture
of the three facades; and that during the occupancy of said building only
the windows of the first story shall be used as show windows." Order dated
May 1. 1918. Note that the board omitted a condition limiting the use of
the building to dry-goods.
18 115 Misc. 449, 189 N. Y. Supp. 772 (1921).
1'200 App. Div. 907 (1922).
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contour established instead. The power to change the map
is reserved by the charter to the board of estimate and appor-
tionment. The power of the board of appeals is confined to
variations in special cases to meet some unusual emergency,
some unnecessary hardship. The consequences at times may
not be greatly different.
' 20
Edward M. Bassett does suggest a difference between an amend-
ment and a variation. 21 If the board of estimate changes a district
from residence to business, every owner of property therein enjoys
the enlarged scope of utility. But if the board of appeals grants a
variation, that represents an equitable adjustment in the specific
case before it. The next week an application for a similar variation
in the same district may be denied.2 2 It is not necessary to go into
1he merits of the distinction to observe that, such as it is, it vanished
when applied to cases where the whole "district" consists of one
square in a "checker-board plan." The fact remains that the
square, which was deliberately and perhaps artificially set up by the
legislative. was.wiped out by the board's, determination as effectively
as by a change in the map. Those with a taste for niceties may
dismiss the coincidence as accidental. But it would seem that if
it is unconstitutional for the board of estimate to delegate the
power to amend the law to the board, it is also unconstitutional for
the board of estimate to establish a number of small districts and
call the change effected by the board of appeals a "variation" in the
application of the requirements therein. That was the thought of
the Supreme Court in annulling the board's action.
"Indeed, it appears to me to be so plain that the so-
called variance is not a variance at all, but an amendment
that only the board of estimate and apportionment itself
has the power to make, as to make it unnecessary to state
reasons that must suggest themselves to any one who gives
the matter the slightest thought." 28
On appeal the case was elaborately argued and the Court of Appeals
20 People ex rel, Fordham Manor Reformed Church v. Walsh, intra note
28, 244 N. Y. at 289.
2 See the first part of his brief, filed as amicus curiae, in People ex rel.
Sheldon v. Board of Appeals, supra note 15.
22 People ex rel, Werner v. Smith, infra note 43.
28 115 Misc. 449, 451, 189 N. Y. Supp. 72.
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took a position different from both lower courts and re-instated the
board's decision.2 4 The argument made below that, what the board
did was virtually to amend the law, was not directly dealt with. The
court seemed greatly impressed with the argument that if the board
could not legally extradict Mr. Astor from his difficulty, then the
zoning law as a whole was unconstitutional.2 ' But this argument
is really an evasion of the question: Is this a "variance" or is this a
statutory provision "set at naught by the board of appeals, taken in
the guise of a variance?" If this is an amendment, of course the
board cannot grant relief. And the source of unconstitutionality
would not be the lack of this power which could not be given the
board, but the fact that the "checker-board" compromise was irra-
tional and arbitrary. If the discussion in Chapter II will be re-
called for a moment, if was there indicated that the board of ap-
peals was needed not as a correcting or improving agency of unwise
zoning, but as a device for adjusting exceptional situations that
may arise in the enforcement of the law. The results of the
'checker-board" arrangement were stated by the Court of Appeals,
but the constitutionality of the plan was not discussed. Once it is
assumed that this is properly a case for a variance, as did the court,
the board's decision was properly sustained under Section (c).
The relation of Sections seven and twuenty,26 to each other.
Section seven:
The Board of Appeals * * * may, in appropriate cases, after
public notice and hearings * * * determine and vary the applica-
tion of the use district regulations * * * as follows:
(c) Permit the extension of an existing or proposed building
into a more restricted district under such conditions as will safe-
guard * * * the more restricted district.
(e) Permit in a business district the erection or extension of
a garage or stable in any portion of a street between two intersecting
24 234 N. Y. 484.
25 "The courts below have decided that the board of appeals exceeded its
power. In that event, the owner-appellant, argues that the zoning is wholly
invalid as the same is violative of its constitutional and property rights.
234 N. Y. at 490.
26 Section 20 was later changed to Section 21. When the cases arose,
it was still numbered 20. In order not to have different references, the old
number is used where the cases discussed refer to that number.
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streets in which portion there exists a gagare for more than five
motor vehicles * * * which existed July 25, 1916.
Section twenty:
Where there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship in
the way of carrying out the strict letter of the provisions * * * the
Board of Appeals shall have power in a specific case to vary any
such provision in harmony, etc.
In the Sheldon case Section seven (c) was involved. The quota-
tion which will follow, will indicate what Judge Hogan, speaking
for the Court of Appeals, conceived to be the power of the board
thereunder.
"When the instant case was before the board of appeals
it was required by law * * * as a result of the hearing and
investigation to conclude and decide the question rising there-
on and thereupon to 'determine' the disposition to be made
relating thereto. If as the result of investigation the board
of appeals shall 'determine' as it did in this specific case, that
there are unnecessary hardships in the way of carrying out
the strict letter of the provisions of the zone resolution and
that substantial justice would be promoted both to the prop-
erty owners and the public interest, its power then was en-
larged to 'vary' (.i. e., under Section twenty) ." 27
It is readily granted that from such interpretation of "determine
and vary" used in Section seven, it does not follow that Section
twenty was eliminated as an independent source of jurisdiction. But
it does follow that in every case where the board acts under Section
seven, it must find that there is unnecessary hardship. This is not
an unsound construction, for it may be argued that the use of "ap-
propriate case" in Section seven referred to situations where there
were such hardships. But, though never expressly criticized, this
view of the inter-relation of both sections was not followed. When
dealing with Section seven (e), Chief Judge Cardozo, in a dictum,
said: "The presence of such a garage, without more, permits the
board in (his?) (its) discretion to authorize a new garage in a busi-
ness district." 28  This would seem to indicate that Sections seven
27234 N. Y. at 494.
28 People ex rel. Fordham Reformed Church v. Walsh, 244 N. Y. 280,
at 284.
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and twenty where wholly independent and that it is within the
board's discretion to determine what is 'an appropriate case" in
which to "determine and vary."
That these sections are independent sources of jurisdiction is
clearly established by People ex rel. Smith v. Walsh.29 The owner
of a corner lot in a business district was authorized by the board to
erect a public garage. On one street there was another garage, and
so Section seven (e) applied. On the other street, however, there
was not an existing stable or garage. To bring himself within Sec-
tion seven, the applicant would have to rely on part (g) which re-
quires him to file consents of 80% of the owners deemed to be af-
fected. Consents were not filed. The Supreme Court sustained
the writ of certiorari. On appeal this was reversed and the board's
decision reinstated. However, the Appellate Division did decide
that it was error for the board to act on the assumption that since
the corner premise faced on the street where Section seven (e)
did apply, the side street where it did not apply could be safeguarded
by conditions. It was pointed out that there were two grounds for
jurisdiction. The board must act under one or the other. It was
then held that despite its erroneous reasons, there was unnecessary
hardship and therefore there was, in fact, jurisdiction under Section
twenty.:, The Court of Appeals approved of the holding that Sec-
tions seven and twenty were sources of independent power. But
the practice of going into the facts to determine whether there was
a sound ground for the board's decision and then and there reinstate
that decision which as read states a bad ground of jurisdiction, was
condemned. The case should have been sent back to the board. How-
ever, since substantial rights of others were not affected, the Apel-
late Division was affirmed. In a later case, therefore, the Appellate
Division looked only to the record to find whether there was in fact
-0 211 App. Div. 205, aff'd, 240 N. Y. 606 (1925) memorandum opinion).
3o It is important to note that Smith v. Walsh established that each para-
graph of Section 7 is of equal force. If any two of them apply, the board
is powerless to act under Section 7 unless both are satisfied. And another
point is. that if the applicant can prove "unnecessary hardship," he need not
first attempt to get his remedy under Section 7, by obtaining consents under
Section 7(g) for example.
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a valid ground for the board's determination. Failing in this, the
writ was sustained.
3 1
The last case that we shaU*l consider on the question whether or
not Sections seven and twenty are independent is People ex rel.
Gross v. Walsh.3 2  The Special Term annulled the board's order
for a variance. It was granted on the ground that there was un-
necessary hardship, i.e., Section twenty. It was held that if that
could be done, then Section seven (g) authorizing the board to vary
where the applicant filed consents, was mere surplusage. On appeal,
the Special Term was reversed. If there was unnecessary hard-
ship, the board could grant a variance under Section twenty even
where the applicant did not try to get the consents. But the Appel-
late Division was not sure that such hardship was established and
so the case was sent back to the board to have that determined on
a rehearing.
The presumptive correctness of the board's action.
That the court is not at fiberty to consider facts de hors the
return and that the facts set forth therein must be accepted as true
seems to be the accepted doctrine in New York and elsewhere.83
In People ex rel. McAvoy v. Leo,34 the action of the board was up-
"' The board purported to grant the application under Section 7(g), when
in fact 80% of the owners affected did not consent. The Special Term
annulled the action because the return indicated that the members of the
board would have voted differently if the application had been brought under
Section 21. In the Matter of Sloan v. Walsh. 217 App. Div. 614, 216 N. Y.
Supp. 181 (1926).
32213 App. Div. 878, rev'ing, 124 Misc. 889, 208 N. Y. Supp. 571 (1924).
3 People ex reL. Helvetia Realty Co. v. Leo, 183 N. Y. Supp. 37, aff'd,
195 App. Div. 887, 185 N. Y. Supp. 949, aff'd, 231 N. Y. 619. 132 N. E. 912, no
opinions in the upper courts.
"The reasons stated on the record in the case at bar, while not overpower-
ly convincing, cannot be pronounced erroneous as a matter of law. With
their soudness in point of fact we have nothing to do. Without commenting
further on the reasons stated in the record, it is enough to say that, having
regard to the nature of the inquiry open under a petition for the writ of
certiorari, we cannot quite say that this action of the board appears on the
record to have been without warrant in law." Norcross v. Board of Appeals,
255 Mass. 177, 150 N.E. 887, 891 (1926), per Rugg, C. . "Only error of
law can be reviewed. Findings of fact are not open to revision." Bradley v.
Board of Zoning Adjustment, 894. And see Hammond v. Board of Appeals,
154 N. E. 82.
, 109 Misc. 255, 175 N. Y. Supp. 513.
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held though the consents upon which the board based its jurisdic-
tion to act were not "duly acknowledged." The court was disposed
to look upon the requirement of a formal acknowledgment as tech-
nical. But the main ground upon which rested the dismissal of the
writ was that "the board had power to grant the relief asked for,
even though there had been no consents at all.'" s: Judge Manning
thought that Section twenty gave jurisdiction and that the board-
.'evidently considered this to be one of the cases in which
the discretionary power possessed by it should be exercised,
and having so determined, and acted within its jurisdiction
its determination * * * cannot be considered as an illegal
official act." "1
Two) years later the board granted an application authorizing the
owner to destroy his stable and replace it by a public garage. This
action was taken under Section seven (a) which allowed the board
to permit to the owner of a non-conforming use "the extension of
an existing or the erection of an additional building." Here again
the court was inclined to interpret Section seven (a) liberally to in-
clude a power to allow the destruction of the old non-confroming use
and authorize the erection of a new one. But it also appeared that
a lublic garage was located on the same side of the street and that
a noisy car barn was situated directly opposite the applicant's prein-
ises. And so the Supreme Court said that even if the liberal con-
struction of the section cannot stand, the decision of the board will
not he upset because there are facts from which it may be inferred
that ,the board believed there was unnecessary hardship in the way
of strict enforcement of the law. Two appeals were taken, but with
no effect. :- 'Ihe upper courts did not write opinions. but the case
was recently approved as correct oni the ground last stated by judge
Cardozo.2s
On the authorities therefore, it appears that when the board
grants an application stating an unsound reason for jurisdiction,
the administrative decision will be:
(1) annulled where the return does not state facts which in-
dicate that the board did in fact have jurisdiction for another rea-
son .'
:1-. Ibid. at 514.
: Supra note 35-.
37 People ex rel. Facey v. Leo. 110 Misc. 516. 180 N. Y. Supp. 553, aff'd.
193 App. Div. 910, 183 N. Y. Supp. 954, ,ff'd, 230 N. Y. 602. 130 N. R. 910.
"' Supra note 28, 244 N. Y. at 290.
"- Sloan v. Walsh. supra note 31.
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(2) sent back to the board if the court feels that a re-hearing
of the facts may disclose a basis for taking jurisdiction.4 0
(3) allowed to' stand where along with the unsound reasons
for exercising its power, the return does indicate that the situation
is one in which it would have been proper for the board to have
assumed jurisdiction.4 1
The last paragraph involves something more than giving pre-
sumptive effect to what appears in the return. It involves treat-
ment of the administrative decision in the same manner as though
the board had made the correct inference from what appears in the
record. The point is well expressed in a dictum by Judge Cardozo : 4 2
"The hardship may be found as an inference from evi-
dence submitted at a hearing * * * At all events, when there
is evidence in the record, whatever inferences therefrom are
proper will be presumed, in aid of the dispensing resolution,
to have been drawn by the board."
When the court was called upon to review a refusal by the
board to grant a variation, the contest as may be expected, was more
bitterly fought. The story of the battle is told in two cases. Both
involved substantially the same issue. The board had previously
granted one or more applications for variations on the same street.
In each, the petitioner's request for a similar variation was refused.
The Special Term sustained the writ in both cases. But the action
of the board of appeals in both was reinstated by the Court of Ap-
peals. In the Appellate Division, different results were reached.
In the first, the board was upheld, two dissented; in the second, the
board's denial of the application was annullled as "unreasonable and
discriminatory." The first is People ex rel. Werner v. Smith;"3
the second is In the Matter of Goldenberg v. Walsh.4"
Judge McAvoy, writing for the majority in the Werner case,
urged in suppport of the board's action (1) that the applicant is
not entitled to a variation because a garage is more profitable than
other uses; (2) the circumstance that the Board of Appeals had pre-
4 Smith v. Walsh, supra note 29.
41 McAvoy v. Leo. supra note 34; Facey v. Leo, supra note 37.
42Supra note 28, 244 N. Y. at 287.
43212 App. Div. 635, 209 N. Y. Supp. 454. a~ff'd, 240 N. Y. 689 148 N. E.
760 (1925).
44213 App. Div. 396, rev'd on the dissenting opinion of McAvoy, J., in 242
N. Y. 82, 152 N. E. 434 (1926).
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viously authorized permits for four other garages does not show
that as to this petitioner there is unnecessary hardship; (3) it does
not follow that because the board had already granted four varia-
tions that the denial of the request for a fifth amounted to arbi-
trary discrimination. He concluded by saying: "The duty of regu-
lation presupposes that there will be some limit to the number of
garages on one block. ' ' 4' The same judge, dissenting in the Golden-
berg case, elaborated his argument as follows:
"* * * there will always be a point at which this legit-
imate discrimination must be exercised in refusing further
permits to vary the application of the building zone resolu-
tion * * * and whether or not such permits should be issued
is committed by statute to the Board of Appeals. The court
should not, as we have heretofore decided in the Werner case,
attempt to exercise a function for which it has neither the
requisite information nor the personal knowledge necessary
to act for the preservation of the surrounding territory de-
signed to be protected in the use to which the building zone
resolution committed it.
4 6
The counter argument expressed by Judge Dowling, speaking for
the majority in the Goldenberg case, was based on an elaborate re-
examination of the facts which was concluded by a finding that-
"Much of the dialogue between the chairman and this
objector was devoted to a discussion of general garage con-
ditions in the Bronx, having nothing whatever to do with
the merit of the application then pending. * * *"
The board's denial of the permit was, therefore, deemed discrim-
inatory." It is interesting to note that a few months previous, Judge
Dowling was not with the dissenters in the Werner case, but was
with the majority, which, in reaching the other conclusion on even
stronger facts, said: "There is a presumption in favor of the cor-
rectness of the determination arrived at by the Board of Appeals"
and that the record does not show that the board-
"* * * abused its discretion, or acted in bad faith, or
that its action was unreasonble, arbitrary. discriminatory or
4-, 212 App. Div. at 638.
46215 App Div. at 399 and 400.
4r7Supra note 46.
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illegal in refusing to vary the application of the use district
regulations; and in such instance we may not substitute the





It was the latter view that prevailed in the end, for the Goldenberg
case was reversed on the dissent of judge McAvoy. The Werner
case, it will be remembered, was affirmed in a memorandum decision.
Where the presumption of correctness did not save the administra-
tive decision.
The clearest case where the court will not indulge in the val-
idating presumption is where the record shows abuse of discretion
or bad faith on the part of the board. Perhaps the strongest deci-
sion of this kind is People ex rel. Cotton v. Leo." A garage in a
residence district was authorized by the board. The board reasoned
that since there was no garage in the locality, the community had
need of this one. Its action was based on Section seven (g) requir-
ing consents by 80% of those affected. It appeared that some own-
ers rather distant from the premises in question who were "deemed
by the board to be affected" gave their consent, while property
directly opposite was not deemed to be affected and was owned by
one who was known to be opposed to the proposed garage. It ap-
peared further that the very site of the garage was included with
the property deemed to be affected. judge Cropsey concluded that
the board's departure from its previous rules further indicated that
action was arbitrary. He found that the board did not even act in
good faith, for its -desire to see the applicant get 80% of the owners
to consent influenced it to decide what property was affected accord-
ing as its owner would or would not give his congent. The determi-
nation by the board was, therefore, annulled.
"This provision of the resolution giving the board the.
power to determine what property is immediately affected does
not give the board arbitrary power in that regard. It cannot
merely by its assertion determine that certain property is af-
fected and other property not affected when the location and
all the facts indicate otherwise." 0
48 212 App. Div. at 638.
40 110 Misc. 519, 180 N. Y. Supp. 554.
."0 180 N. Y. Supp. 554. 556. Because the action was not in good faith,
costs were assessed against the board.
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At the other extreme lie the case where the presumption in
aid of administrative finality is ineffective though the board acted
in good faith and in furtherance of the general purpose of the zon-
ing law. Such a case is In the Matter of Multiplex Garages v.
Walsh. The law forbids in a business district a garage for more
than five motor vehicles."' An owner who obtained permits for
a number of small garages for less than five cars, had the permits
revoked by order of the Board of Appeals and the case was taken to
court and the Special Term annulled the determination. The Ap-
pellate Division reached the opposite conclusion and reinstated the
board's order.
"There is practically no difference between a public gar-
age for more than five motors under one roof and the dis-
tribution of small garages over an entire plot where more
than five motor cars may be accommodated."
But in a memorandum opinion the order of the Appellate Division
was reversed and that of the Special Term affirmed upon the opin-
ion of Judge Merrell, who dissented below. The dissent founded
itself upon the fact that the building zone resolution was in dero-
gation of common law rights and as such, must be strictly construed.
That being done, there was no violation of the ordinance. 2
The middle group of cases that we shall now consider con-
cerns the annullment of the board's determination, not because evi-
dence of abuse or bad faith rebutted the aiding presumption, but
because the record failed to disclose the necessary facts upon which
that presumption could become operative. It was thought, for ex-
ample, that "Section 20 of the zoning resolution is usually the final
refuge of the board when it wants to do something for which there
is- no authority in law."3 And so it was laid down that the facts
showing practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship in the way of
literal enforcement of the law must appear in the return, for the
conclusion that there is hardship must be a reason and not an after-
thought.14  The year after these two decisions, an inspection com-
-2 See Building Zone Resolution, §4(5).
52 213 App. Div. 289, rev'd, 241 N. Y. 527 (1925). And see People ex rel.
Hyman v. Leo, 108 Misc. 39, 177 N. Y. Supp. 503 (1919). An "existing"
garage does not include one that has been under construction for three years.
53 Swedish Hospital v. Leo, 120 Misc. 355, 359, 198 N. Y. Supp. 397 (1923).
• 4Supra note 53. And see People ex rel. Brennan v. Walsh, 195 N. Y.
Supp. 264 (1922).
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mittee resented the fact that the applicant had already built the ex-
tension for which a permit was now sought. The case was previously
mentioned in another connection.-, It was there said:
"* * * it is clear that none of the recited 'whereases'
of the decision touch upon or deal with even impliedly, the
question of 'practical difficulties and unnecessary hardship,'
and it does not appear from the return that such question
was decided. A refusal to 'vary' without a determination
of that primary and necessary question is at least an illegal
disposition."'
And we have also seen that "desecration of the community,"" and
"a reasonable adjustment of the Building Zone Resolution ' 7 8 were
not proper reasons upon which to deny or allow a variance.
The whole question was finally disposed of by the Court of
Appeals in People ex rel. Fordham Manor Reformed Church v.
Walsh." The board allowed an application for a public garage in
a residence district because (1) the existence of a garage for 180
cars immediately adjoining is sufficient justification to permit another
garage; (2) "the Board of Appeals is of the opinion that a real
hardship would be imposed on the owner of said property if pre-
vented from using it for garage purposes;" (3) hardship or injus-
tice will not befall the objecting parties, rigid conditions having
been imposed. The allowance of the certiorari order at Special
Term was reversed in the Appellate Division which in turn was re-
versed by the Court of Appeals.'"' Nothing in the return indicated
5 People ex rel. Kannensohn Holding Corp. v. Walsh. 120 Misc. 469. 470.
471, 472. 199 N. Y. Supp. 534 (1923).
e Ibid. at 471.
. People ex rel. Parry v. Walsh, 121 Misc. 631, 202 N. Y. Supp. 48, aff'd,
209 App. Div. 889 (1923).
38 Matter of McGarry v,. Walsh, 213 App. Div. 289 (1925). Not infre-
quently, one finds in the final resolution of the board the preliminary "Whereas
the applicant contends that there would be great hardship in preventing him
from making the proposed use of his property," followed by a resolution
granting the application. 10 Bulletin, No. 5, pp. 120, 121. These resolutions
would probably be held bad. for it is not enough to contend; one must prove
that there is hardship.
"9244 N. Y. 280 (1927).
80 While the majority (per Clarke, P. J.) thought that In The Matter of
Goldenberg v. Walsh controlled supra note 44, the dissent felt that "it is
clear that the board of appeals acted upon a mere assertion of claim that
practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship existed without any evidence or
fact to justif r such conclusion." 217 App. Div. 177, 184 (1926).
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that this land if not occupied by a garage was incapable of applica-
tion to some other profitable use-an apartment house, for example.
Judge Cardozo found no evidence of unnecessary hardship in the
record.
"If such hardship exists, the reasons for its existence
should appear from the return. Only thus can a court know
whether they are substantial or illusory. * * * We thwart
the scheme of the statute if we uphold a resolution for the
concession of a privilege with neither evidence at the hearing,
nor allegations in the answer to be accepted as a substitute
for evidence. The Legislature had said that there shall be
review by certiorari. Such review becomes impossible if
without suppporting evidence or equivalent averment, the
mere conclusion of hardship is sufficient and indeed decisive.
There has been confided to the board a delicate jurisdiction
and one easily abused. Upon a showing of unnecessary hard-
ship, general rules are suspended for the benefit of individual
owners, and special privilege established. Nothing is before
us to justify or even suggest doubt of the good faith and sin-
cerity with which the power has been exercised. At the same
time judicial review would be reduced to an empty form if the
requirement were relaxed that in the return of the proceeding
(and?) all hardship and its occasion must be exhibited fully
and at large. Safeguards of this order have at times an aspect
of triviality when our scrutiny is narrowed to one instance or
another. Their value is perceived when the outlook is ex-
tended to something wider than particulars. Disclosurc is the
antidote of partiality and favor."6'
The power of the court to hear evidence.
It will be noticed that in the Fordham case, the Court of Ap-
peals sent the case back to allow the renewal of the appeal before
the board. In Kannensohn v. Walsh': and in Parry v. Walsh"
another practice was followed, viz., the court went into the weight
of tme evidence to reach a conclusion on the merits. When this
procedure was followed in Smith v. Walsh, 4 the Court of Appeals
"' 240 N. Y. 280. 290, 291.
-_,Supra note 55.
6: Supra note 57.
,4Supra note 29.
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expressed its disapproval and recommended that a proper procedure
required the case to be sent back to the board. It, therefore, becomes
pertinent to inquire what interpretation was given to the charter
provision authorizing the court to take evidence in some cases:
"If, upon the hearing, it shall appear to the court that
testimony is necessary for the proper disposition of the mat-
ter, it may take evidence as it may direct and report the same
to the court with his findings of fact and conclusions of law,
which shall constitute a part of the proceedings upon which
the determination of the court shall be made.""e
The nature of the power thus conferred upon the court was involved
in the early zoning case of People ex reL West Side Mortgage Co. v.
Leo." An application to the board for a permit approving plans for
a building to be used for a stable and a garage was granted. But
on the record it appeared that through some error, the granting
resolution of the board referred in terms only to a garage. It was
held that the applicant's remedy must be sought of the board and
not of the court because the court's jurisidiction begins only after
the board takes final action. In other words the Charter does
"not provide for a hearing of the matter de novo, nor that the status
of the matter shall be the same as if it had been instituted originally
in the reviewing court."'  It is only when the reviewing court
is in doubt as to whether the board was justified in taking juris-
diction that it may take testimony calculated to show whether juris-
dictional facts were established. 68 This was illustrated in a case
where, upon an erroneous interpretation of Section twenty in rela-
tion to Section seven (g), the Special Term annulled the board's
a-- Charter §719a- 4.
do 174 N. Y. Supp. 451 (1919)..
67 Ibid. at 456.
a. The matter lies within the discretion of the court. Thus where the
granting of a variation in the application of set back requirements was sought
to be reviewed, and the existence of evidence not considered by the board
wa alleged, it was held that "inasmuch as the function of the court in a
proceeding of this character is merely to determine whether the board of
appeals had jurisdiction to take the action (they) did take and whether
(sic) they abused their discretion on the evidence before them, I do not
think a reference stiould be ordered." People ex reL Helvetia Realty Co. v.
Leo, 183 N. Y. Supp. 37, aff'd, 195 App. Div. 887, 185 N. Y. Supp. 948, aff'd,
231 N. Y. 619, 132 N. F 912 (1920). There were no opinions by the upper
courts.
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determination. On appeal the lower court was reversed, but since
it was not clear that the jurisdictional fact of unnecessary hard-
ship existed, the court in the Appellate Division said:
"We therefore remit the proceeding to the Special Term
to take testimony and determine the question as to whether
practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship existed justify-
ing the variance under Section twenty."
Though this seems to be an effective and direct method of
judicial control, it has not been often employed.89 A literal appli-
cation of the charter provision brings us dangerously near the point
of making the reviewing court an appellate board of appeals. As
opposed to the courts which say that the board's findings of fact
and decision are presumptively correct and will not be disturbed
unless abuse or bad faith are apparent upon the record, we have
this charter provision that enables the court to look beyond the
record and enter its own findings and conclusion. The court has
delimited its power in this manner. In the West Side Mortgage
Co. case, all the court had before it for decision was that court
review will not be allowed unless the board first makes a final dis-
position of the case. But Judge Giegerich went on to say that
the charter provision allowed the court to go into the facts only
for the purpose of discovering whether the board reasonably took
jurisdiction. The same judge decided the Helvetia case where the
question of ordering a reference was directly involved. As indi-
cated in the footnote," it was there decided that unless the record
evidences an, abuse of discretion, the court in its discretion will
not order a referee to take the case over. In other -words, the
express charter provision that the courts have power to take tes-
timony was almost completely whittled away. For it is not denied
that in the absence of such provision, the court may, upon reason-
able suspicion of abuse arising from facts in the record, send the
case back to the board. That is all that the court did when acting
pursuant to this charter provision. People ex rel. La Vine, Inc., v.
Walsh was a case where the Special Term took testimony and
upon the basis of its findings annulled the board's decision which
refused a variation.
It is believed that the cases here discussed are the only cases deci'lcd
involving this phase of judicial control of the zoning board of appeals.
-" Supra note 68.
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"Upon record before us, we make a finding of fact that
the enforcement of the strict letter of the Zoning Resolution
would work unnecessary hardship to the relator; and as a
conclusion of law, we hold that the case is one for a variance
under and pnrsuant to Section twenty of the Biilding Zone
Rcslution."'7
Of course, the actual granting of the variance and the safeguarding
conditions that may be necessary, was left for the board.
HERMAN L. WEISMAN.
New York City.
-1 N. Y. L. J.. Jan. 1925, at p. 1215. This was affirmed in 124 App. Div.
805, 219 N. Y. Supp. (1925), where this method of taking testimony and
entering findings was approved.
